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I. INTRODUCTION
A ballot initiative proposed in 2012 would have adopted, by constitutional
amendment, a "public trust doctrine" for all water in Colorado. Since 1994,
Richard Hamilton and others have proposed a series of similar initiatives to
add a public trust doctrine to the state's constitution. Many lawyers and water
experts, let alone most voters, are uncertain what that phrase means. This article reviews the roots and evolution of the public trust doctrine and the contrasting rejection of the doctrine as inconsistent with legally established water
appropriation rights in Colorado. It concludes by examining the proposed
public trust ballot initiatives in this framework.
A rancher on the dry Arizona Strip recounted the range wars fought over
water on those desert lands north of the Grand Canyon. He summarized,
"There are three scarce things of value out here-gold, women, and water. If
the government has to take two of them, why then, leave the water." The
rancher's words capture the essence of the continuing struggle over western
water. First, without water, life itself, let alone development, is impossible in
the West. Water development has been the foundation of Colorado's economy, from its early settlement continuing to its present cities and towns, farms,
industry, and recreation economy. Second, Colorado's arid climate, in contrast
with most other states, requires more intensive water development. The basic
precept of economics-demand exceeds supply-applies acutely to water in the
West. Competition for water is fierce; there is not enough to satisfy everyone's
desires.
The Colorado Constitution recognized these realities in its provisions on
water that were adopted at statehood in 1876. While the constitution declares
water of natural streams "to be the property of the public," this water is "dedicated to the use of the people of the state," and is "subject to appropriation,"
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both past and future.' Moreover, the right to divert such water for beneficial
use "shall never be denied," so long as prior appropriations are satisfied.'
These sections "establish an ascertainable and stable policy for allocation of a
scarce and essential resource."' The Colorado Constitution's water rights principles have survived intact since statehood, despite repeated attempts since
1994 to impose a public trust in water by constitutional amendment through
Colorado's initiative process.
Finally, and especially relevant to the public trust doctrine, water wars have
lost none of their importance or intensity, and governments (local, state, and
federal) are usually in the thick of the fray as combatants or arbiters. There
may be no more notorious or enduring water war than that fought over Los
Angeles' water diversions from California's Owens Valley, immortalized in the
movie "Chinatown." In yet another battle of that continuing war, the California
Supreme Court in 1983 provided a new "weapon," one ultimately more effective at stopping the flow of water to Los Angeles than the irate Owens Valley
ranchers' dynamiting or occupation of the aqueduct decades before.' This new
"weapon" is the archaic and once almost-forgotten public trust doctrine, given
new life and force by the judiciary.
The public trust doctrine, originally of limited and circumscribed application, has been judicially expanded into a doctrine that could undermine the
foundations of appropriative water rights in Colorado, as it has in California.
Used as an environmental litigation tool in some states, this expansive public
trust doctrine has become a trump card judges or regulators can play to deny
new water rights or abrogate existing water rights in the name of environmental
values, while hoping to avoid the constitutional mandate to pay just compensation for those water rights.
In a recent decision, the US Supreme Court reaflirmed that the doctrine
is purely a matter of state law.' Thus, the Colorado Constitution controls
whether Colorado will recognize a public trust in water. The Colorado Supreme Court soundly rejected the first moderii attempt to apply the public
trust doctrine to Colorado." In two later cases, the state's highest court did not
even consider a public trust doctrine in addressing questions of public interest
and public duties with regard to water rights; in both cases parties had argued
public trust without success in the trial court, but on appeal, the same parties
shied away from advocating the public trust doctrine as such.' But while the
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
Id. S 6.
3.
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rghis Protection in Waler Quahty
han 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 841, 879 (1989).
4. Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983)
1.
2.

(en banc).
5.
PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1234-35 (2012). See discussion idifa

Section
6.
Section
7.

II.C.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (en banc). See discussion Aifda
III.B.
Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colo. Water Conseivation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1259-

61 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (addressing the Water Court's role and CWCB's statutory public
duties regarding its instream flow water rights on Snowmass Creek); In re Bd. of Cnty.
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Court has shown little inclination to reconsider its rejection of the doctrine, the
voters may have an opportunity to consider addressing the issue by amending
the constitution if some future version of the proposed initiative appears on
the ballot.
II. ROOTS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. THE TRADITIONAL PUBuC TRUST DOCTRINE-NAVIGABILITY

Defining the public trust doctrine is an elusive exercise, somewhat like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall. The University of Colorado's own Professor
Charles Wilkinson, a proponent of the doctrine, describes it as "complicated,"
noting it comes in "many different forms."' Professor Joseph Sax, who first
advocated an expanded role for the public trust doctrine, said, "Certainly the
phrase 'public trust' does not contain any magic such that special obligations
can be said to arise merely from its incantation."' Regardless of its alluring
name, the public trust is hardly a trust at all." In fact, it eludes classification." It
is "not so much a substantive set of standards ... as it is a technique by which
courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative
process."" The doctrine is primarily a creation of the courts and has evolved
into different forms in different jurisdictions. In a thorough study of the public
trust doctrine's legal history, Professor James Huffman concluded that the
doctrine's legal roots may be muddled because its proponents, to encourage
judicial action, "have created a mythological history of the doctrine."
The public trust doctrine is most easily understood in its "traditional" or
"core" form." Traditionally, the public trust doctrine was a common law restraint on government, preventing sovereign authority from defeating public
access to navigablewaters and the lands beneath them." The doctrine, derived
from Roman law, developed under England's monarchy to prevent the Eng-

Comm'rs. v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 971-73 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (the "Union Park"
case, rejecting arguments on appeal for broad consideration of "public values" in awarding new
conditional water rights). See discussion infra Section II.B.
8. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Publc Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source & Scope of the TraditionalDoctrie, 19 ENvTL. L. 425, 426 (1989).
9. Joseph A. Sax, The Public Trust Doctane in Natura Resource law: Efectivejudicial
Intenention,68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 485 (1970).
10. George A. Gould, The Public Trust Doctrine& Water Rights, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 25-1, 25-10 (1988).
11. James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Publc TrustDocirein a Constitutonal
Democracg 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) [hereinafter Huffian, Fish Outof Water.
12. Sax, supra note 9, at 509.
13. James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the Pubhlic Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENY-rL L. & POL'Y F. 1, 101 (2007) [hereinafter Huffman, History of the
Pblic TsI].
14. See Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 426-27.
15. See Gould, supa note 10, at 25-11 to -13; Michael C. Blumm, Public Property& the
Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrie, 19
ENVTL. L. 573, 580 (1989).
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lish Crown from transferring title in the submerged lands underlying navigable
waters.'"
English common law apparently did not trust the Crown to resist the
temptation of bestowing favors on its supporters by deeding them title to submerged lands and thus control over the navigation of the overlying waters."
The Crown could convey its other holdings to its favored subjects," but public
navigation of English waters was so important, historic, and entrenched that
the common law restraints on the Crown, following the Magna Carta, included
protection of public access to navigable waters by preventing conveyance of the
underlying lands."
The most prominent American case on the traditional public trust doctrine is the U.S. Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Illnois Central Railroad
Co. v. Illinois' In 1869, the State of Illinois granted to the Illinois Central
Railroad Company its right and title to the submerged lands of Lake Michigan
beneath Chicago's harbor." This grant was made to allow the railroad to develop the harbor and waterfront." Illinois later underwent a change of heart
and sued the railroad, claiming the state still held title to the submerged lands
and the right to develop the harbor." Illinois relied on the public trust doctrine
to argue that it had never truly granted title and exclusive control of the Chicago harbor and waterfront to the railroad."
The Supreme Court agreed:
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and
sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several
states, belong to the respective states within which they are found, with the
consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be
done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters."
The Court then held that this same doctrine applied to "public, navigablewater, on which commerce is carriedon between different states or nationd' be-

16. See Huffman, Fish Out of Water, supra note 11, at 541; see also Kemper v. Hamilton,
274 P.3d 562, 572 (Colo. 2012) (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
17. See Huffman, Fish Out of Water, supra note 11, at 550.
18. See Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 430-31.
19. See Huffman, Fish Out of Water, supra note 11, at 550. There is controversy over
whether the Crown could actually divest itself of tide to lands underlying navigable waters. See
Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 430-31, n. 31. One authority states that alienation of title to submerged lands was categorically prohibited, while another states that transfer of title was prohibited only if the effect was to impede public access to the navigable waters. See id.Whatever the
correct position, the cornerstone of the doctrine was preserving public access to navigable waters.
20. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
21. Id.at438.
22. Id. at 439.
23. Id. at 433-34.
24. Id. at 439.
25. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
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cause any distinction between tidal and such navigable waters would be "arbitrary and without any foundation.""
The Court explained that the state held tide to lands submerged under
navigable waters in a different fashion than other lands:
It is a title held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the
natvigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have lberty of
Iishingtherein, freed from the obstruction or inteiference of private parties."
The Court then delineated the constraints on a state conveying tide to
these lands:
The trust devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has
an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control
of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such
parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining.'"
Thus, under the traditional public trust doctrine, the state may convey tide
to lands beneath navigable waters, but must retain suflicient control to assure
the purpose of the trust is not substantially impaired. Notwithstanding the language or intent of any conveyance of these submerged lands, "there always
remains with the state the right to revoke those powers and exercise them in a
more direct manner, and one more conformable to its wishes."'"
"There can be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance of property by a
grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was bound to hold and
manage it."" Thus, the public trust doctrine is an extreme example of caveat
emptor or "buyer beware." Every grant of tide to lands beneath navigable waters is, whether or not the conveyance says so, subject to the state's inalienable
power to revoke its conveyance for trust purposes.
It is a remarkable doctrine, to say the least, which prohibits a state from
disposing of its own property as it wishes, and allows it to renege on conveyances even if at the time of conveyance the state fully intended to part with fee
title to the property. It also places an enormous burden on parties dealing with
the state: conveyances of property by the state cannot be taken at face value,
but are continually subject to an implied and inalienable right of revocation.
Such a doctrine might cause private parties to cease dealing with a state unless the courts narrowly limit the application of the doctrine. Thus, the "navigability" requirement embedded within the traditional public trust doctrine
limits it to obvious needs for navigation and commerce:

26.
27.

Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
Id. at 452 (emphasis added).

28.

Id.at 453.

29.
30.

I. at 453-54.
Id. at 460.
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The principle of the common law to which we have adverted is found upon
the most obvious principles of public policy. The sea and navigable rivers are
natural highways, and any obstruction to the common right, or exclusive appropriation of their use, is injunious to commerce, and, if permitted at the will
of the sovereign, would be very likely to end in materially crippling, if not destroying, it."

Ihiois Centralwas decided under Illinois law, not federal law." It "was an
exceptional case yielding an exceptional result."" Nevertheless, it has frequently been cited as precedent in the last forty years, often with little understanding
of its unique facts and narrow holding." Some form of this holding has been
adopted by most state courts that have encountered similar issues. An Arizona
court counted up to thirty-eight states that had concluded a state holds lands
beneath navigable waterways in trust for the public." However, it remains to
the states to define which waters are "navigable,""' and to "recognize private
rights in [public trust lands] as they see fit.""
B. WHO MADE THE PUBLIC TRUST KING?
An extraordinary characteristic of the public trust doctrine is that its legal

basis and origins are unclear. Courts and commentators have struggled with
this question." This is remarkable considering the public trust doctrine can
operate as an almost super-constitutional restraint on, or empowerment of,
state governments in those jurisdictions where it has been held to apply. But
neither the United States nor the state constitutions mention such a trust."
Neither has it been, except in rare instances, adopted by statute." Absent ex-

31.

Id. at 458.

32. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (reaching a contrary result
under New York law); Gould, supra note 10, at 25-11.
33. Huffman, Historyof the Public Trust, supra note 13, at 67.
34. Id. at 54-67; see abo Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Ongins of the
Public Trust Doctine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. Cu. L. REV. 799

(2004).
35. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 167 n.13 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991).
36. Jan S. Stevens, The Publc Trust:A Sovereign's Ancient PrerogativeBecomes de People'shnironmenta/Right,14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 195, 202 (1980).

37. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988); see also PPL Mont.,
LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012).
38. See Wilkinson, supia note 8, at 428, 434, 437, 439; William D. Araiza, The Public
Trust Doctrine as an Interpretve Cnon, 45 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 693, 699-701, 703 (2012)
(exploring the doctrine's ambiguous legal foundation); Huffiman, Fish Out of Water, supna note
11, at 539-42, 544-45; see also James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to.Judges: A
Comnent on the Public Trust Wrings of ProfessorsSa, Wilinson, Dunnmg & .Johnson,63
DENV. U. L. REV. 565, 567 & n.16 (1986) (note cases cited therein).
39. See Huffman, Fish Out of Water; supra note 11, at 545; Blumm, supa note 15, at 57677 & n.12 (lists of relevant state constitutional provisions but no express declarations of public
trusts).
40. See Blumm, supra note 15, at 587-89 (discussing statutory construction with no citation
to express adoptions of the public trust). Arizona has adopted a statute limiting waters consid-
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press adoption, the doctrine still operates as a surprising limit on states' sovereign power to allow private rights in state property.
Various explanations have been offered for the source of its adoption."
One apparent source was suggested by the Supreme Court in the Illinois Cenu-al era: the common law of England preserved navigability of tidal waters, and
upon independence, this constraint on title passed to the original thirteen
states as sovereigns." These principles were then applied in other states because they entered the Union "on equal footing," implicitly taking tide to tidelands from the United States, but subject to the limits inherent in the United
States' and original states' title." However, "the Supreme Court will not impose
the public trust doctrine on any state, even as to the beds of navigable waters.""
State constitutions are commonly cited as potential sources, but only by inference from references to navigation or public ownership.'
Absent constitutional sources, many consider the doctrine to be a natural
law or an inherent limitation on government that is commonly and mutually
understood though unexpressed. For example, the Romans' Justinian Code is
frequently cited for the imposition of the trust," though no one seriously would
argue that any US jurisdiction has adopted Roman law, even if some are influenced indirectly by it. Professor Wilkinson seems to support this concept of
inherent limitation; he describes the "ancient roots" of several countries' "special treatment to major bodies of water.""
Professor Harrison Dunning probably stated this proposition accurately:
What [the courts] may be saying ... is that the public trust doctrine limits legislative freedom because it is implied state constitutional doctrine, one that
springs from a fundamental notion of how government is to operate with regard to common heritage natural resources, that is, government must protect

ered navigable for public trust purposes and limiting public trust values to commerce, navigation, and fishing. H.R. 2589, 41st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. ch. 277, (Ariz. 1994).
41. For example, Professor Wilkinson says the public trust doctrine "derives from constitutional, statutory, and common-law sources." Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 426 n.6; see also Huffman, Fish Out of Water, supa note 11, at 528-29; Gould, supra note 10, at 25-5 to -7, 25-11 to 12.
42. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434-37 (1892); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 16 (1894).
43. Shively, 152 U.S. at 27-28; Cinque Bambini P'ship v. Mississippi, 491 So. 2d 508, 511
(Miss. 1986), aIfd sub non. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); see also
Huffinan, Fih Out of Water, supra note 11, at 539; but cf Wilkinson, supranote 8, at 439-48
(criticizing the "equal footing" rationale).
44. Gould, supra note 10, at 25-13; see also PPL Mont., LLC. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215,
1234-35 (2012).
45. See Huffman, Fish Out of Water,supra note 11, at 545-54; Blumm, supra note 15, at
574, 576.
46. "By the law of nature these things are common to mankind - the air, running water, the
sea and consequently the shores of the sea." Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (en
banc) (quoting Institutes ofJustinian 2.1.1).
47. Wilkinson, supia note 8, at 428-29.
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public access to such resources unless there is a solemn decision to the contrary.
The search for sources grows as the public trust doctrine expands beyond
its traditional scope.'
Most of these explanations, however, are unpersuasive."o Moreover, they
do not justify imposition of such a doctrine in Colorado, where the state constitution expressly guarantees the property right to appropnate waters of the
state for beneficial use. Creative legal propositions cannot impose a public
trust doctrine contrary to such an express constitutional guarantee.
C. PPL V. MONTNA: CIAlUFYING THE LEGAL CONTEXT AND SCOPE OF
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The US Supreme Court recently revisited the public trust doctrine in PPL
Montana, LLC v. Montana ("PPL Montana")." In PPL Montana, the Court

more clearly defined the scope of the doctrine in the context of the equal footing doctrine and the federal common law that governs questions of navigability
for state title. Both topics bear on the ongoing legal issues in Colorado and
other Western states regarding not only the public trust doctrine, but also public strean access, as discussed below. Thus, PPL Montana clarifies the legal
framework for evaluating the public trust doctrine and the legal basis on which
Colorado has declined to impose the public trust on water rights.
PPL Montana, LLC ("PPL") owns ten hydroelectric generation facilities in
Montana located on riverbeds underlying segments of the Clark Fork, Missouri, and Madison Rivers. Five PPL dams are located on the Great Falls
reach of the Upper Missouri River. Four other darns, two located on the
Stubbs Ferry stretch of the Missouri River and two on the Madison River, constitute the Missouri-Madison project, and the Thompson Falls Project is located on the Clark Fork River. In 2003, the parents of Montana school children
sued PPL in federal court, seeking compensation for the utility company's use
of what the parents characterized as "state-owned riverbeds" at its various facilities:1 Those plaintiffs contended that under Montana law, the riverbeds were
part of the state's school trust lands, and as such, PPL was obligated to compensate the State Land Board for its use of the land." The State joined the

48. Harrison C. Dunning, The Pblic 7}ust: A Fundanent;dDoct7ie ofAmeiican Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 523 (1989). Professor Wilkinson summarizes: "The real headwaters
of the public trust doctrine, then, arise in rivulets from all reaches of the basin that holds the
societies of the world." Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 431.
49. The type of law embodied in the public trust doctrine is also unclear. Some suggest
what the name implies: it is trust law. Others contend it to be constitutional law, or adninistrative law. And some say it is a matter of property law: an implied easement for public navigation.
50.
See Huffinan, Fish Out of Watej; supra note 11, at 534-60.

51.
52.
53.

132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
Id. at 1225.
Id
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lawsuit against PPL in 2004, seeking compensation under the school trust land
theory."
The federal suit was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but
prior to dismissal, PPL filed suit in state court against the State of Montana.
PPL sought a declaratory judgment that the State could not seek compensation
for its use of riverbeds in the Clark Fork, Missouri, and Madison Rivers." The
State then filed a counterclaim, seeking a declaration that PPL must compensate the state for the use of its lands as well as damages for what it alleged was
PPL's unlawful past and ongoing use of those lands without compensation to
the state." Ultimately the trial court granted the State's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the issue of navigability, holding that the ivers in question were
navigable in fact at the time Montana became a state in 1889 for purposes of
the equal-footing doctrine, and ordered PPL to pay forty-one million dollars in
rent for use of the riverbeds from 2000-2007.-" PPL appealed, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision." PPL then appealed to
the United States Supreme Court."'
The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed the
Montana Supreme Court." The Court held that the Montana Supreme Court
misapplied longstanding precedent when it determined that the rivers in dispute in the case were navigable in fact at the time of statehood and that the
Montana Supreme Court placed too much weight on evidence of present-day
use of the rivers in its determination of navigability."2 Finally, the Court addressed the State of Montana's argument that denying the state title to the riverbeds in question was a violation of the public trust, as conceived in Montana,
by clarifying that navigability in fact with regard to title under the equal-footing
doctrine is a matter of federal law, while the public trust doctrine is a creation
of state law."'
1. Navigability in Fact
The Montana Supreme Court's decision was a departure from federal
case law reaching back to the nineteenth century that established the "navigability in fact" test for determining state title under the equal-footing doctrine.
The Supreme Court summarized the equal-footing doctrine in PPL Montana,
explaining:

54. PPL Mont., LLC v. State (PPL V:State), 229 P.3d 421, 427 (Mont. 2010), rev'd, 132 S.
Ct. 1215 (2012).
55. PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1225.
56. PPL v. State, 229 P.3d. at 427.
57. Id. at 428.
58. Id. at 405.
59. Id. at 405, 432.
60. PPLMontana, 132 S. Ct. at 1226.
61. Id. at 1221, 1235.
62. Id. at 1233-34.
63. Id. at 1234-35.
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Upon statehood, the State gains title within its borders to the beds of waters
then navigable.... It may allocate and govern those lands according to state
law subject only to 'the paramount power of the United States to control such
waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.' The
United States retains any title vested in it before statehood to any land beneath waters not then navigable ... to be transferred or licensed if and as it
chooses."
First articulated in The DanielBall, and relied upon since, the test for determining navigability in fact for purposes of the equal-footing doctrine is
whether waters "are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for comnerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water."' Courts
have applied some variation of The Daniel Ball test to determine the navigability of waterways in multiple contexts. It is relevant to determinations of tide
to riverbeds, as well as in cases considering the navigability of waters in the
regulatory context and under federal statutes addressing waterways and their
underlying beds." These three legal issues are distinct, however, in their respective definitions of navigability. The Montana Supreme Court mistakenly
relied on case law addressing navigability in these other contexts when it determined the rivers in dispute in this case were navigable in fact at the time of
statehood."
The Supreme Court has dways addressed the question of navigability in
fact for purposes of title by analyzing a river in segments, "based on the 'natural and ordinary condition' of the water" at the time of statehood."' The Montana Supreme Court rejected this analysis, characterizing the segment approach as "a piecemeal classification of navigability-with some stretches declared navigable, and others declared non-navigable."" In place of the segment
approach, the Montana Supreme Court took the view that "short interruptions" in navigability could not defeat the classification of an entire river as
"navigable."" Under this theory, the court held that the seventeen-mile portion
of the Upper Missouri River that is central to PPL's operations, the Great Falls
reach, was navigable at the time of statehood.7 The court explained that portages, or land routes to circumvent torrential portions of rivers, "are not sufficient to defeat a finding of navigability."" The Supreme Court disagreed, noting bluntly that portages do defeat navigability "because they require transportation over land rather than over the water.""
64. 132 S. Ct. at 1227-28 (citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55
(1926)).
65. 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
66. PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1228.
67. Id. at 1231-32.
68. Id. at 1228 (citing Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922)).
69. Id. at 1229 (citing PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.3d 421, 448-49 (Mont. 2010)).
70. PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.2d 421, 441-42 (Mont. 2010).
71. Id. at 440.
72. Id. at 438.
73.

PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1231.
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The Court ultimately concluded the seventeen miles of riverbed that make
up the Great Falls reach, "at least from the head of the first waterfall to the
foot of the last, is not navigable for purposes of riverbed title under the equalfooting doctrine."" This proclamation is noteworthy because PPL had not
previously moved for summary judgment on the question of navigability.
Thus, although the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Montana Supreme Court's decision, the Court's conclusion as to the navigability of the
Great Falls reach limits the possible result on remand.
The Court also addressed the Montana Supreme Court's analysis of present-day use as an indication of navigability at the time of statehood." The
Court reaffirmed the longstanding principle that commercial use is synonymous with navigability for purposes of the equal-footing doctrine." Indeed,
navigability "concerns the river's usefulness for 'trade and travel,' rather than
for other purposes."" Evidence from the time of statehood, that explorers or
trappers may have portaged alongside the harsher stretches of river to stay on
course, is not enough to establish navigability." Past decisions have recognized
that present-day recreational or other use may be indicative of whether the
river was "susceptible of being used," depending on the nature of the presentday use."
In order to rely on present-day use as evidence of the pre-statehood quality of a river, the proponent must show the following elements: "(i) the watercraft are meaningfully similar to those in customary use for trade and travel at
the time of statehood; and (ii) the river's post-statehood condition is not materially different from its physical condition at statehood."" The Montana Supreme Court failed to make any findings as to what kinds of watercraft are
currently utilized on the rivers in question." It also failed to address PPL's
evidence that the presence of its dams for the last several decades had changed
the quality of rivers such that "the river has become 'less torrential' in high
flow periods and less shallow in low flow periods.""
2. The Public Trust Doctrine
The Court also addressed Montana's arguments regarding the public trust
doctrine. The State argued denying it tide to the riverbeds in dispute undermined the public trust doctrine, as it "concerns public access to the waters
above those beds for purposes of navigation, fishing, and other recreational

74. Id. at 1232.
75. Id. at 1233-34.
Id. at 1230.
76.
77. Id. at 1233 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931)).
Id. at 1233 (citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 20-21(1935)).
78.
79. Id. (quoting United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940)
("[Plersonal or private use by boats demonstrates the availability of the stream for the simpler
types of commercial navigation.").
80.
Id. (citing Oregon, 295 U.S. at 18).
81. Id. at 1234.
82. Id. at 1235.
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uses."" The Court clarified that title pursuant to the equal-footing doctrine and
the public trust doctrine are entirely separate concepts, with different legal
bases." The equal-footing doctrine is, as discussed above, "the constitutional
foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title," while "the public trust
doctrine remains a matter of state law."' The Court further clarified that its
holding in the seminal public trust case, Illinois Central," was "necessarily a
statement of Illinois law."" Accordingly, "the contours of that public trust do
not depend on the Constitution . .. land] the States retain residual power to
detennine the scope of the public trust over waters within their borders."'
The outcome of PPL Montana was significant for riparian landowners not
only in Montana, but throughout the West. As a coalition of Colorado landowners with predominantly agricultural interests pointed out in an amicibrief,
the most disturbing aspect of the Montana Supreme Court's decision may
have been its willingness to rule on navigability as a matter of summary judgment." Justice Rice of the Montana Supreme Court was equally concerned,
noting in his dissent that the majority had deprived PPL of its right to trial by
the improper entry of summary judgment.' Having reviewed the substantial
evidence produced in the case, Justice Rice further stated,
PPL has satisfied its burden [on summary judgment] to produce substantial
evidence that the disputed reaches of the rivers were, at the time of statehood, non-navigable. The Court's decision to the contrary makes one wonder just what evidence the Court would have considered sufficient for PPL to
defeat summary judgment in this case."
As long ago as 1922, the US Supreme Court recognized the danger identified by Justice Rice, warning that "Islome states have sought to retain title to
the beds of streams by recognizing them as navigable when they are not actually so. It seems to be a convenient method of preserving their control."" Stability is at the core of any defense to claims by the states to riverbeds that have
long been under the control of private landowners or the federal government.
As the Montana Supreme Court's award of "rents" to the state proved, not
only would tide to such lands be open to attack across the West, had the decision been affirmed, but owners of water rights put to economic uses also could
have been subject to fees or rents imposed by state governments by assertion
of a "public trust" and title through the courts. These concerns were echoed in
83. Id. at 1234.
84. Id. at 1235.
85. Id.
86. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
87. PPL Montana at 1235 (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 285 (1997);
Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926)).
88. PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1235.
89. Brief for Creekside CoaL et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at * 10, PPL
Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218), 2011 WL 3947563 Ihereinafter
Creekside Coal. BJ].
90. PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.3d 421, 477 (Mont. 2010).
9 1. Id.
92. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 89 (1922).
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amici briefs filed by Colorado agricultural and livestock interests, Montana
water and irrigation districts, and the US government."
The Supreme Court left no doubt that navigability for title purposes is a
federal question, and one that is answered through its longstanding and well
established tests articulated in case law reaching back to the nineteenth century. The Court found it significant that, although PPL and its predecessor had
operated several of the facilities at issue in the case for more than a century,
the State had never previously sought to obtain rents for its use of supposed
"state-owned riverbeds."" The Court closed with what may be interpreted as a
commitment to the stability of long-settled property rights, by quoting its deci-

sion in Brewer-Elliott.
It is not for a State by courts or legislature, in dealing with the general subject
of beds or streams, to adopt a retroactive rule for determining navigability
which ... would enlarge what actually passed to the State, at the time of her
admission, under the constitutional rule of equality here invoked.'
The Court's clarification of the public trust doctrine was just as forceful,
rejecting the State's assertion that its public trust interest warranted deference
to its determination of title, while establishing that the public trust doctrine is a
creature of state, and not federal law." The Court also clarified that the case
most often relied on to support a federal public trust in water, Ilinois Central,"
was based on state law." This is a significant affirmation of the legal basis on
which the Colorado courts have long held (as discussed below) that the Colorado Constitution provides no basis for a public trust in water, and thus, no
public trust may be imposed on the waters and water rights of the state.
The decision is significant for riparian landowners in the state as well. As
discussed below, there is an ongoing debate amongst Coloradoans as to the
existence of a public "right to float" Colorado streams. PPL Montana puts to
rest some aspects of this debate, along with any question whether federal law
may dictate a public trust doctrine.

93. Creckside Coal Br., supra note 89, at * 1-2; Brief for Mont. Water Res. Ass'n et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *4, PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012)
(No. 10-218), 2011 WL 4040422; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *7, PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218), 2011 WL
3947562.
94. PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1235.
95. Id. (quoting Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 88 (1922)).
96. Id. at 1234.
97. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
98. PPLMontana, 132 S. Ct. at 1235.
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III. A FISH OUT OF WATER:" DIFFERENT NEEDS AND
DIFFERENT PRINCIPLES FOR THE WEST
A. BEYOND THE 100TH MERIDIAN: NAVIGABILITY AND WESTERN RIVERS
On a fine July day in 1869, "Captain" Samuel Adams stood on the banks
of the Blue River near Breckenridge, congratulating the forward-looking peopie of that town for helping him ready his expedition with four boats and ten
men." Adams purportedly had spent time boating the Lower Colorado River
in a small steam-powered stem wheeler, and was convinced that reports of
large chasms and impassable churning waves upstream on the Colorado were
fanciful tales of unfaithful spies sent to examine the Promised Land.' Captain
Adams was convinced the Colorado River was to become the Mississippi River of the West, connecting Western States in a grand continual stream of
commerce." Adams also believed that smooth water covered the Colorado
River from its headwaters all the way to the Ocean.' He had tried to join up
with Major Powell's expedition, but Powell and his men did not take him seriously and rebuffed his attempt to join them."" Adams commenced his own
expedition to prove the navigability of the Colorado River through the Western States."
After launching their boats, Adams and his crew had scarcely floated a few
miles past the confluence of the Blue River and Ten Mile Creek when they
unexpectedly ran into Boulder Creek rapids and lost much equipment."' Further downstream, two of their boats were destroyed; with two boats remaining
and a crew depleted by deserters, Adams continued on to Gore Canyon."'
Adams at least had the common sense not to try to float through Gore Canyon, but he still lost his remaining boats trying to get through the canyon. He
also lost all but two of his men to desertion. The remaining adventurers built
rafts and continued, but after losing successive rafts and more equipment and
provisions, they finally admitted defeat somewhere above the confluence of
the Eagle and Colorado Rivers." Had Adams continued, he soon would have
run into the deadly cascading rapids in Glenwood Canyon above today's Shoshone Power Plant. Still ahead were the lark waves of Westwater Canyon and
the enormous haystacks and hydraulics of Cataract and Grand Canyons.
Captain Adams' disastrous adventure was the result of his false assumption
that Colorado's largest river was navigable. In fact, no river in Colorado has

99.
100.

Our apologies to Professor Huflman (see note 11, supm).
DoUG WHEAT, THE FLOATER'S GuIDETO COLORADO 41 (1995).

101.

See WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND

THE HUNDREDTH

MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY

POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST 50-51 (1954); WHEAT, supml note 100, at

41.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

WHEAT, supa note 100, at 41-42.
STEGNER, supra note 101, at 51.
WHEAT, sulin note 100, at 42.
Id.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43, 47.
Id. at 42-44.
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ever been recognized as navigable in fact, or navigable under state law.'" This
fact has particular importance under Ilhnois Centraland PPL Montana,which
defined a navigable body of water as one sustaining commerce between different states or nations."'
Captain Adams' hard lessons also highlight the simple truth that gave rise
to the appropriation doctrine: rivers and man's needs for water are different
west of the 100th Meridian, rendering navigability a fantasy. East of that line,
which crosses western Kansas, water is more plentiful, feeding streams that
really have been used for navigation."' Without more urgent needs or scarce
supplies, eastern states' powers and laws were developed based on riparian
rights and navigability. Their premise was that "reasonable use" of water-the
basic riparian right-would never seriously affect the flow of the large navigable
rivers.
But west of the 100th Meridian, such navigability generally ends. With it
ends the basis for imposing a public trust doctrine as a historic and extraconstitutional restraint on states' power to allow private rights in their resources. The rivers of the West are not like those of the Midwest or East. In
their natural state, they flood in late spring and taper off to trickles by midsummer. Some western rivers may now provide excellent sport for whitewater
enthusiasts, but their nature was never that of navigable rivers; nor was navigation a common public value inextricably intertwined in the fabric of settlement
between the High Plains and the Sierras. The reasons common law judges
protected title to lands submerged under tidal or navigable waters are largely
absent west of the 100th Meridian. Water is scarce. It must be diverted from
its course to be used, and must be stored to be used optimally. Weighed
against these necessities, Captain Adams' dream of Colorado navigation is
foolish and frivolous. The traditional public trust doctrine has no practical
application here.
B. COLORADO'S CONSTITUTION, PRIOR APPROPRIATION, AND ITS
RFIECTION OF A PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Colorado water law is grounded in the constitutionally guaranteed right of
prior appropriation."' Unlike several other states, Colorado's constitutional
declaration regarding public ownership of unappropriated waters is expressly
and exclusively for use by appropriation:
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the
state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the
109. See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (en banc); In re German
Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1913).
110. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892); PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at
1228; contrast the Clean Water Act's "Alice in Wonderland" definition of "navigable waters" as
"the waters of the United States. . . ." 33 U.S.C. S 1362(7) (emphasis added).
111. Professor Wilkinson, in emphasizing the importance of navigable waters, recounts the
critical role such navigability played in the history of the country. But the waters mentioned are
those west of the 100th Meridian. Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 436-37.
112. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, S 5.
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same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropria-

tion as hereinafter provided."'
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that this provision "simply and
firmly establishes the right of appropriation in this state."' This declaration is
paired with the express constitutional right to appropriate water: "The right to
divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall
never be denied.""
Colorado courts have long emphasized the property nature of appropriative water rights, holding that appropriation creates a "most valuable property
right" in the exclusive use of water."'
A priority to the use of water for irrigation or domestic purposes is a property
right and as such is fully protected by the constitutional guaranties relating to
property in general."'
Advocates of public ownership have argued unsuccessfully that implied
and inherent constitutional limitations such as the public trust doctrine limit
this express constitutional guarantee of appropriative rights. The Colorado
Supreme Court in People v. Emmert followed the state constitution by refusing to apply the public trust doctrine to Colorado's waters."'
Emmert involved rafters who were charged with trespassing on private
property for floating down a section of the upper Colorado River, not far from
Gore Canyon, which was the site of Captain Adams' debacle."' In their defense, the rafters claimed a public easement on the river based on the public
trust doctrine. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this defense: "[W]e do
not feel constrained to follow the trend away from the coupling of bed title
with the right of public recreational use of surface waters as urged by defendants.".. The court elaborated:

We recognize the various rationales employed by courts to allow public recreational use of water overlying privately owned beds, i.e., (i) practical considerations employed in water rich states such as Florida, Minnesota and
Washington; (ii) a public easement in recreation as an incident of navigation;

(iii) the creation of a public trust based on usability, thereby establishing only
a limited private usufructurary right; and (iv) state constitutional basis for state
ownership. We consider the common law rule [of. private ownership] of

113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025,1028 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
115. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, S 6.
116. Navajo Devel. Co. V.Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); Nichols
v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 280 (Colo. 1893).
117. Farmers Irrig. Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 369 P.2d 557. 559-60 (Colo. 1962) (en
bane).
118. Ennert,597 P.2d at 1029.
119. Id. at l025.
120. Id. at 1027.
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more force and effect, especially given its longstanding recognition in this
state. 21
This decision also was based on the stipulated fact that the upper Colorado River was non-navigable."
Colorado's constitutional declaration of "public property" in unappropriated water is simply for "use of the people," not for navigation but by appropriation. The only state protection required is protection for appropnation,
not protection fAom use or for preservation." "Colorado's rejection of the
public trust doctrine as a water allocation mechanism is justified on the basis
that the doctrine does not provide standards by which the judiciary can determine the allocation of quantities of water between competing demands."'M
In subsequent decisions, the Colorado Supreme Court has shown no inclination to reverse course and consider adopting a public trust doctrine. For
example, the Union Park case" involved claims for large volumes of transmountain diversions and storage on the headwaters of the Gunnison River,
met by a panoply of objections ranging from water availability to environmental concerns, some under the rubric of a public trust doctrine. After an unsuccessful effort to argue the public trust doctrine as grounds for objection in the
water court ('Water Division 4), some of the objectors cross-appealed, arguing
that the water court erred in not considering the environmental impacts of the
Union Park Project and that the term beneficial use "inherently encompasses
a broad public policy of protecting the natural and man-made environment."''
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that in adjudicating water rights, such environmental interests may be recognized only to
the extent of instream flow water rights held by the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB").1 "Conceptually, a public interest theory is in conflict
with the doctrine of prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the
absence of statutory authority, deny a legitimate appropriation based on public
policy."'" Accordingly, the Court rejected "the cross-appellants' invitation to
create a complex system of common law to balance competing public interests.""
A few months later, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the CWCB's
responsibilities as the statutory holder of decreed instrean flow water rights on

121.
122.
123.
Gould,
124.
125.
banc).

126.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1026.
"If anything, [such] constitutional language imposes a trust on water for appropriation."
supranote 10, at 25-53 (emphasis in original).
Hobbs & Raley, supm note 3, at 881.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 957-58, 971 (Colo. 1995) (en

dat971.

Id. at 971-73; see also COLo. REv. STAT.
127.
priate minimum instrean flows).
128. Bd. ofCnty. Conunm'rs, 891 P.2d at 973.
129. Id.

§
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Snowmnass Creek." In a split decision, the majority recognized the CWCB has
a "unique statutory fiduciary duty" and may not unilaterally reduce the previously decreed amount of instream flow without the water court's approval."
The majority's initial slip opinion repeatedly characterized the CWCB's
unique duties as a "public trust.""' In response to a motion for rehearing, the
Court revised these characterizations, deleting all reference to a "public trust,"
instead relying on the CWCB's "unique statutory fiduciary duty.". Meanwhile,
Justice Mullarkey's dissenting opinion pointed out the inconsistency of the
majority's rationale with Colorado's historical water rights principles, noting,
"This court has never recognized the public trust with respect to water."'
Ironically, in light of Colorado's steadfast rejection of a public trust doctrine, some commentators continue to cite an unpublished 1969 federal case
from Colorado as authority for applying the public trust doctrine to private
land." Defenders of Flofissant v. Park Land Co." involved ancient fossil beds
lying partly beneath a property owned by a developer who was poised to begin
excavation for and construction of a residential subdivision."' In fact, Congress
was in the midst of designating the property a national monument during the
trials and appeals, but had not yet passed a law to do so." The plaintiffs successfully obtained a temporary restraining order from the Tenth Circuit, which
remanded the case to the US District Court for the District of Colorado for a
hearing on the merits." The district court dismissed the case without reaching
the merits, and the plaintiffs filed a successful emergency appeal with the
Tenth Circuit after the developer declared that he was ready to begin excavation on the property with bulldozers."' The Tenth Circuit's equitable order
130.

Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251,

1253 (Colo. 1995) (en banc).
131. Idat 1259-61.
132.
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., No. 93SC740,
slip op. at 19-24 (Colo. June 19, 1995); see also Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Has the Colorado Stpinremne CowtAnnulled the Insurani FlowProgmn?, 16 U. DENV. WATER L. REP. 1 (1995).
133.
Aspen Wldemess, 901 P.2d at 1259-60.

134.
135.

Id.at 1263 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., John Hedges, Cireits in Calilomia Water Liw- 77he Push to Integ7rate
Giundioaterand Surface Water Mnagemnent 7rough the Cous, 14 U. DEv. WATER L.
REv. 375, 392-93 (2011); Darren K. Cottriel, The Right to Hunt fih the Thventy-fiist Century:
('a the Puhe Tvst Doctnne Save an Ameician Tadition?, 27 PAC. Lj. 1235, 1264 (1996);
Joan E. Van Tol, The Public TristDoctine:A New Approach to EnvironmentadPreservation,
81 W. VA. L. REv. 455, 462 (1979); Victor John Yannacone, Jr., Agricultual hnds, Fertile
Soils, Popuar Sovercigi, the Trust Doctaine, Enironmental Impact Assessment and the
NaturalLaw,51 N.D. L. REv. 615, 633 (1975); Joseph L. Sax, Liberatingthe Public 7ust Doc-

trine from ItssHtoricalShackles, 14 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 185 (1980); Joseph L. Sax, The Pubhlic
7rst Doctriue in NatualResowrce Law: Effective.Judici'd Itervention,68 Mich. L. Rev. 471,
473-76, 556 (1970); Joseph L. Sax, Takhigs, Pivate Propertyand Publbc Rigts, 81 YALE LJ.

149,159 (1971).

136. VICrOR YANNACONE, JR., BERNARD S. COHEN & STEVEN C. DAVIDSON,
ENVIRONMENTAL RICHTS AND REMEDiES 39-45 (1972) (discussing at length the unpublished

case of Defenders of Florissant v. Park Land Co., No. 403-69 (10th Cir.July 29, 1969)).
137. Id. at 40.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 42.
140. Id. at 42-43.
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granting the emergency appeal and the resulting indefinite restraining order
were not accompanied by an opinion and made no reference to a public trust
doctrine."' The court's extraordinary order briefly mentioned the adequacy of
the pleadings and affidavit for a temporary restraining order to prevent irreparable harm-the only issue pleaded by the plaintiffs-and did not discuss the
legal merits of the underlying case."' Before any further judicial action could
take place, Congress designated the property a national monument." As the
California Court of Appeal has recognized, Fonssantis "an unreported case
in which the court did not pass on the issue of obtaining the fossil under a
public trust."" The Florissantcase remains a popular story considering that
the decision is not only unpublished, but is unavailable without visiting the
National Archives building in Lakewood, Colorado. Clearly, the Tenth Circuit
did not intend for this temporary equitable decision to be cited as precedent
for public trust law, where the public trust doctrine was not mentioned, the
merits of the case were never addressed, and the controversy was mooted by
an act of Congress.'" So, it appears that this case is not precedent at any level,
but simply another instance of the "mythological history" created by proponents of the public trust doctrine."
C. COLORADO AND THE "RIGHT TO FLOAT": STREAM ACCESS DISPUTES
SINCE EMMERT

As mentioned above in the context of Ernmer4 proponents of expansive
rights to public access of Colorado's streams, often referred to as the "right to
float," have often relied on the public trust doctrine to support the argument
that a right to float and access to streambeds throughout the state exists."' The
debate has continued, even after the Colorado Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument in Emmert" Moreover, some attempts to impose a public
trust on Colorado water rights through the initiative process have combined
access and public trust issues."' Those who support such an application of the
public trust in Colorado make much of other states' public trust doctrines,
which often include a right to float. However, Colorado's Constitution, as well

141. Id.
142. Id. at 43-44.
143. Pub. L. No. 91-60, 83 Stat. 101-102 (1969).
144. San Diego Archaeological Soc'y v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923, 923 n. 2 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1978).
145. Pub. L. No. 91-60, 83 Stat. 101-102 (establishing Florissant Fossil Beds National Monument).
146. See Huffman, Hstory ofthe Public Trus; supra note 13, at 101.
147. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
148. Perhaps most notably, in the pages of this publication, Colorado water attorneys Lori
Potter and John R. Hill provided their best arguments for and against the right to float in 2001
and 2002. See John R. Hill, Jr., The "Rht"to Float Through PrivateProperty h2 Colorado:
Dispelhngthe Myt/, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 331 (2001); see also Lori Potter, Steven Marlin & Kathy Kanda, Legal Underpbinings of the Riht to Float Through Private Propertyin
Colorado:A Reply tojohn Hill, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 457 (2002).
149. As discussed infra Section VI.
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as more basic property rights principles, weighs heavily against the creation of
such rights in Colorado."
1. Colorado's Constitution: The Right to Appropriate
In Emmer4 the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly held that no right to
float exists in Colorado."' In accordance with its previous decision in Hartman
v. Tresise," the court concluded article XVI, section 5 of the Colorado Constitution "simply and firmly establishes the right of appropriation in this state.""
Despite the court's ruling, commentators who argue in favor of the right to
float often cite Wyoming's Constitution as evidence that the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted this provision of the Colorado Constitution too narrowly with regard to public access and the public trust.'" The corresponding
provision of Wyoming's Constitution provides "the water of all natural
streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries
of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state."" In Emmner4
the Court specifically addressed the difference between the Colorado and
Wyoming Constitutions, noting, "[significantly, unlike Colorado's counterpart
constitutional provision, the Wyoming provision does not mention appropriation. As such, it has been regarded as a stronger statement of the public's right
to recreational use of all surface waters." Ironically, the Court cited the godfather of the modem public trust doctrine, Joseph Sax, for this proposition, concluding Colorado's Constitution does not provide the basis for a public right of
access." Arizona and Montana's constitutions use language similar to Wyoming's in providing public rights to those states' waters. However, the uniquely
Coloradan concept of the public right of appropriation distinguishes these
other states' recognition of a right to float.
2. Navigability in Fact: Colorado's Non-Navigable Waters
Proponents of the right to float in Colorado also argue for the application
of the public trust doctrine to the state's streambeds." The argument goes that
those navigable waters that are subject to the equal-footing doctrine and thus
owned by the state are held in the public trust, and as such, the public should
be able to access them.'" This argument is similarly restrained, however, by the
Colorado Supreme Court's recognition that the drafters of the Colorado Constitution were familiar with the geography of the state, and "knew that the natu150. COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 5.
151. Emmett,597 P.2d at 1030.
152. 84 P. 685 (Colo. 1905).
153. Emnert,597 P.2d at 1028.
154. See Richard Gast, People v. Enmert:A Step Backward for Recreational Water Use i'
Colorado,52 U. COLO. L. REv. 247 (1981); see also Potter, Marlin & Kanda, supra note 148.
155. WYo. CONST. art. 8, S 1.
156. Enuner4 597 P.2d at 1028.
157. Id. (citing JOSEPH L. SAX, WATER LAw: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 354 (1965)).
158. Potter, Marlin & Kanda, supranote 148, at 480-81.
159. Id. at 479.
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ral streams of this state are, in fact, non-navigable within its territorial limits,
and practically all of them have their sources within its own boundaries, and
that no stream of any importance whose source is without those boundaries,
flows into or through this state.""
In her 2002 article arguing for a right to float in Colorado, Lori Potter
found this pronouncement and others that followed from the Colorado courts
problematic because the courts had not surveyed the state's rivers."" Potter
argued that until the courts had decided, on a drainage-by-drainage basis, what
streams were and were not navigable, the possibility remained that a public
trust may yet apply to some of Colorado's waters."' She advocated that Arizona's approach to navigability determinations, as set forth in Defenders of
Wildlife v. Hull,"' should be followed by Colorado"'-a somewhat persuasive
position in 2002, prior to PPL Montana.
Notably, in Defenders of Wildlife and other cases examining the public
trust doctrine, Arizona courts have consistently relied on Ilhinoi's Central as
"the seminal case on the scope of the public trust doctrine and the primary
authority today." The Arizona Court of Appeals stated that it was bound by
the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Centralwith regard to its public trust
obligations."; In light of the US Supreme Court's recent ruling in PPL Montima, which clarified that the public trust doctrine is a matter of state law and
that Ilinois Centrd was decided based on Illinois law, it remains to be seen
whether and to what extent Arizona law regarding the public trust will shift.
Certainly, any argument that Colorado is obligated to follow Arizona's lead as
to the public trust, assessing navigability for title to the state's water on a
stream-by-stream basis, has lost any persuasive authority following PPL Montana.
3. A Statutory Right to Float and the Problem of Takings
While Eninertwas under consideration, the Colorado Legislature revised
the criminal code to define "premises" as "real property, buildings, and other
improvements thereon, and the stream banks and beds of any non-navigable
fresh water streams flowing through such real property.". The legislative history of this revision to the criminal code indicates that legislators were concerned
160. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912) (en banc), ovenuled on other
grounds by United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d I (Colo. 1982) (en banc).
161.
Potter, Marlin & Kanda, supra note 148, at 480-81.
162. Id. at 484-85.
163.
18 P.3d 722, 728, 738-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an Arizona statute meant
to release the state's property interest in certain Arizona stream beds was unconstitutional. Plaintils argued the statute violated the Arizona Constitution's gift clause, as well as the public trust
doctrine. The court held that without a "particularized assessment" of the navigability of each
streani in question under the statute, the statute was indeed invalid.).
164. Potter, Marlin & Kanda, supra note 148 at 481-85.
165.
Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 168 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)
(alteration in original) (quoting Kootenai Envd. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671
P.2d 1085, 1088 (ldaho 1983)).
166.
Id. at 168.
167. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-504.5 (2012).
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with prohibiting rafters' access to private land as they floated the state's
streams, but did not intend to impose criminal liability for the recreational use
of the waters themselves."
Proponents of the right to float seize upon the legislature's revision to the
criminal code as proof of the right to float in Colorado." Even if the legislature's intent was not clearly documented, John Hill's conclusion that
"[diefining a crime and creating a public easement are fundamentally different
things" still stands.'0 In light of the Colorado Supreme Court's explicit rejection of a right to float, it would seem unlikely that the criminal code could reallocate property rights merely by redefining "premises" for certain crimes.
Ultimately, despite the myriad ways the Colorado courts or the Colorado
Legislature could construe a right to float in Colorado, neither has chosen to
create such a right. Moreover, the issue of potential takings claims by riparian
landowners, discussed in greater detail below, remains a constant check on the
development of an expansive public access right in Colorado.

IV. CALIFORNIA BROADENS ITS PUBLIC TRUST REVOCATION
POWERS.
A. BEYOND NAVIGATION

After the Ilhinois Centraldecision, the public trust doctrine continued as a
relatively narrow and uncontroversial legal doctrine."' Limited to questions of
navigability and title to submerged lands, it had no reason to assume a more
prominent role in the legal arena. While the doctrine was not ignored or dismissed, it did not expand in scope until recent decades."'
In 1970, Professor Joseph Sax published his landmark law review article,
"The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention."' Professor Sax's article detailed the history of the public trust doctrine and urged courts to apply the doctrine expansively, taking it far beyond
its traditional foundation of navigability."' The article had its desired effect and

168.
Hill, supra note 148, at 334-35.
169. Potter, Marlin, & Kanda, supra note 148, at 475-77.
170. Hill, supra note 148, at 338.
171.
The history and impact of the public trust doctrine could be compared to that of the
federal reserved rights doctrine. See Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Tivst Doctrine and
Western Waer Law: Dzicordor-Hannony, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-01, 17-43 to 1745. Reserved water rights were long considered to be an obscure peculiarity in Indian law under
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The reserved water rights doctrine, however,
exploded in scope with the case of Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), expanding the
reserved water rights doctrine to all manner of federal land reservations and withdrawals. Disputes over federal reserved water rights have kept water lawyers busy ever since.
172.
See Huffman, Histoiv ofthe Public Tust, supra note 13, at 62-63, 67.

173.

Joseph L. Sax, 772c Public Tr'st Doctine in NatvralResource Lav: LTective judicial

Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
174.
Id. at 475-76, 556-57.
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sparked a renewed interest in the doctrine, not in its traditional form, but expanded to encompass a much larger scope in natural resources law.'
Since that time, the public trust doctrine has expanded most rapidly and
drawn the most attention in California. Three landmark cases have resulted in
radically expanded application of the doctrine. The first case was Marks v.
1hiney," which upheld a claimed public trust easement over certain tidelands for which California had long ago issued a patent. The court held that
any patent of tidelands was subject to an implied public trust easement."7
More significantly, the California Supreme Court set the public trust doctrine adrift from its anchor of navigation purposes, holding that the public trust
easement was not limited in scope to the traditional uses of "navigation, commerce and fisheries."'7 Rather, the Court treated the public trust as an amorphous public right changing to accommodate whatever use or, more accurately, non-use, a reviewing court thought appropriate for the public:
'

The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not

burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization
over another. There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands
trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area."

California's expansion of the public trust doctrine imposed an easement
that was not for navigation needs, but for protection of the tidelands from
those needs-not for use, but for prevention of use, leaving the natural environment intact.'

The second case was City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda,"'
which tried to untangle the Gordian Knot of applying the doctrine many years
after the fact to the San Francisco Bay. In an effort to develop the Bay, the
State long ago had conveyed title to numerous parcels of the Bay that were in

175. Professor Michael Blumm later commented that Sax's public trust doctrine "represents
every law professor's dream: a law review article that not only revived a dormant area of the law
but continues to be relied upon by courts some two decades later. Nearly twenty years ago,
Professor Sax initiated modern interest in the public trust doctrine vith publication of his seminal article." Michael Blumm, PublicProperty& the Democratizatonof Westen Water Lawe: A
Modem View of the Public TrustDoctane,19 ENVTL. L., 573, 574 (1980).
176. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).
177. Id. at 380.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. The leap taken by the court in Marks v. Whitney was crucial to Marks, the holder of
the patent to the tidelands. Under the court's decision, he could not fill and develop the property because of the public easement. If navigation were the concern, Marks' plans to build a marina would have furthered the trust purpose. Id. at 381.
181. 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980).
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fact submerged by the high tide reach of navigable waters."' Many areas had
been filled in, and the shore and high tide line had been pushed far outward in
many instances." California's Land Board and the City of Berkeley, which had
long previously conveyed tidelands by patent to private owners, then asserted a
public trust against the private owners."'
The California Supreme Court had settled the question long before; it
ruled in 1915 that under an.1870 act of the California legislature, these lands
were conveyed in fee simple, free of the public trust." Notwithstanding that the
San Francisco Bay had been extensively developed based on the law (affirmed
by the California Supreme Court's 1915 decision) that the lands were conveyed free of the public trust," the California Supreme Court in 1980 overruled its previous cases and held that a public trust did exist over those tidelands of the San Francisco Bay." The difficulty was how to apply the public
trust doctrine after the fact, now that much of the patented land had been
filled in and developed as a harbor. With no apparent legal premise, the Court
legislated its own solution: those parcels not filled in remained burdened by
the public trust."' The public trust continued only where the property "is still
physically adaptable for trust uses.""
The retroactive effect of City of Berkeley raises more difficult luestions.
The Court did not directly address whether its decision created a constitutional "takings" problem-whether the government, here aided by the court's reversal of prior law, was depriving private owners of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court left little doubt as to its view of such a takings claim: because
regulation already made it very difficult to fill the tidelands, "the econoiruc loss
to the grantees of such lots is speculative at best and is clearly outweighed by
the interests of the public." Moreover, judicial recognition of a public trust,
even many years after people relied on contrary decisions, implies the land
really never was conveyed free of the trust. Upholding the public trust, at least
where it has always existed, even if unrecognized, "takes" only what the government has always had.
Perhaps the case's greatest significance, however, is the Court's justification for its Solomonic application of the public trust doctrine in City ofBerkeley. Its justification was that belated recognition of the public trust doctrine
should not undo an irretrievable commitment of resources, one that was inex-

182. Jd. at 367.
183. Id. at 366.
184. Seeid.
185. Knudson v. Kearney, 152 P. 541 (Cal. 1915) (en banc), ov'eidWedbvCity of Berkeley v.
Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980); see also Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. City of
Alarneda, 70 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (reaching a similar holding), oveinded bv City
of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980).
186. Bekele, 606 P.2d at 374-75 (Clark, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 368-73.
188. Id. at 373-74.
189. Id.at373.
190. Id. at 374.
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tricably intertwined with the development of the resource itself."' If the tideland was filled, it was filled, and not even the mighty public trust doctrine,
which can reverse even the inherent legislative power of the state, could undo
the past physical change. Even this last restraint, though, would soon be attacked.
B. CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC TRUST AND APPROPRIATION RIGHTS: THE SAGA
OF MONO LAKE AND LOS ANGELES

The public trust doctrine's newfound potential to undo past commitments
of water use rights comes from California's well-known Mono Lake case, National Audubon Society v. Supenor Court," involving the saga of Owens Valley and Los Angeles. In its 1983 Mono Lake decision, the California Supreme
Court first applied the public trust doctrine to appropriative water rights, expanding the potential stakes of such a doctrine for Colorado. The Court held
that Los Angeles' 1940 penuit for water rights to streams feeding Mono Lake,
which had been used since 1941, must be reconsidered in light of the effects
Los Angeles' diversions had on the ecosystem of Mono Lake.'
Mono Lake is a large saline body of water in Eastern California, situated at
the foot of the Sierra Nevadas."' Many believe it is an area of unique natural
beauty and features.'" The lake's saline waters support a population of brine
shrimp, which in turn serve as food for millions of local and migratory birds.'"
The lake is also a stoppmig point in the pathway of migratory birds and an important breeding ground for California gulls."
Just south of the lake is the Owens Valley, from which Los Angeles has
diverted much of the water flowing off the east slope of the Sierra Nevadas
into the city's aqueduct." Los Angeles supplemented its supply of water by
extending its aqueduct and diversions to the Mono Lake basin."" Los Angeles
first acquired by condemnation the riparian rights of landowners adjoining
Mono Lake, and then obtained state permits (the California equivalent of water decrees) to divert from four tributary streams.'" From 1940 to 1970, the
city diverted on average 57,000 acre-feet per year from these streams above
Mono Lake."' The city completed a second aqueduct, and between 1970 and
1980 its annual diversions from these streams averaged 99,850 acre-feet.'"

191.
192.
193.

See id.at 373.
Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (en banc).
Id. at 728-29.

194.
195.

Id. at 711.
See id. at 716.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 713, n.4
Id.at714.
Id.
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Environmental groups sued to stop the diversions, based on observed and
anticipated environmental effects." The lake surface had dropped considerably, and experts predicted that if the diversions continued unabated, the lake
would shrink to roughly half its original size." The diversions and reduced
lake size threatened to increase the salinity of the water, reduce the supply of
the lake algae and brine shrimp and thus food for the birds, reduce the birds'
water supply, and expose their nesting grounds to predators." Reduction of
lake size was also alleged to impair the lake's value as a unique scenic, recreational, and scientific resource."'
Although the streams from which Los Angeles diverted were not themselves navigable, the California Supreme Court imposed the public trust doctrine because the streams fed Mono Lake, which the court held was navigable
for brine shrimp fishing." The Court reasoned that if the doctrine prevents
filling navigable waters when it destroys navigation, then extracting water that is
needed to maintain navigable waters downstream also triggers the doctrine
because it "destroys navigation and other public interests."" Thus, in California, the public trust leaped beyond its traditional restraint on alienation of tide
to submerged lands to cover rights not only in navigable waters, but also in
waters tributary to navigable waters. Moreover, the public trust now protected
water not only when needed for navigation, but also for the new environmental, recreational, and ecological values of the trust: "lIlt prevents any party
from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the
interests protected by the public trust.""
The Court recognized that appropriative water rights and the public trust
doctrine were on a "collision course""' and that either doctrine fully applied
would exclude the other." In the end, the Court favored the implied public
trust doctrine and required that state agencies and courts take it into account
when awarding or reconsidering appropriative water rights." The Court thus
held that the state may award appropriative rights even if they could foreseeably harm public trust uses, but the state has an affirmative duty to consider the
public trust and may award rights that would harm trust uses only in cases of
"practical necessity."' The state may always revoke, curtail, or otherwise modify an existing water right to protect a public trust interest, whether or not it had

203. Id. at 715-16.
204. Id. at 715.
205. Id. at 715-16.
206. Id. at 716.
207. Id. at 719.
208. Id. at 720 (quoting Ralph W. Johnson, Puhle Th-ist Protection lor Strearn Flow5 and
Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 257-58 (1980)).
209. Id. at727; seealoid.at719.
210. 658 P.2d at 712.
211. Id. at 712, 727.
212. Id. at 727, 728; Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Futue of
Witer Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 269 (1990).
213. 658 P.2d at 728.
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thoroughly considered effects on this interest when originally allocating the
right."
Mono Lake was hardly ever used for traditional "navigation."" However,
located at the opposite end of the Owens Valley is Owens Lake, once a similarly briny lake that was truly navigable.' Owens Lake supported steamboat
navigation during a silver mining boom from 1872 to 1882.7 By 1924, however, Los Angeles' diversion of water from Owens Valley left Owens Lake completely dry."' With no real concern for navigation,. Los Angeles was never ordered to curtail its diversion of water to replenish the lake."' Instead, during
exceptionally wet years, Los Angeles discharged water it did not need or could
not take back to the Owens River, which began to fill up the dry lakebed."
This flooded the facilities of mineral developers who were leasing the lakebed
from the state, and they sued."' Los Angeles ultimately was enjobled from restoring water to a lake that once had supported navigation." The contrasting
fates of Owens Lake and Mono Lake confirm the pragmatic limit of the public
trust doctrine the California Supreme Court recognized in City of Berkeley
even the public trust should not reverse state-permitted development that has
permanently altered the resource"

This result confounds the traditional public trust doctrine, which shackled
the state's ability to harm the trust purpose of navigation. Under the Mono
Lake case, by contrast, California can do what no state could do under the
public trust doctrine: revoke rights granted, in good faith, in non-navigable
streams to protect non-navigation uses; except that trust purposes must yield in
cases of "practical necessity." To apply the public trust doctrine to water bodies, rights and uses never contemplated under the traditional doctrine, extending even to the prevention of any use, is an unprincipled stretching of a doctrine designed to promote use. The newly desired end of environmental protection cannot justify taking such judicial license with an already superconstitutional doctrine.
Such a decision is somewhat understandable in the context of California
water law, where appropriative water rights had been a latecomer and remain
subordinate to public navigation and early riparian and other rights."' For
214. Id.
215. Actual navigation on Mono Lake was limited to occasional harvesting of brine shrimp.
Id. at 719.
216. See Natural Soda Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 240 P.2d 993, 993 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1952); People v. City of Los Angeles, 200 P.2d 122, 123, 125 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948),
opinion vacated by People v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 695 (1950) (en banc).
217.
Louis W. CLARK & VIRGINIA D. CLARK, HIGH MOUNTAINS & DEEP VALLEYS: THE
GOLD BONANZA DAYS 107-08 (1978).
218. Natura/ Soda Prods., 240 P.2d at 994.
219. See People v. City ofLos Angeles, 200 P.2d at 125.

220. See Natural Soda Prods. Co., v. City of Los Angeles, 143 P.2d 12, 15 (Cal. 1943) (en
banc).
221.

People v. City ofLos Angeles, 200 P.2d at 123-24.

222. Id. at 122, 127.
223. See 606 P.2d at 532, 534-35.
224. See Gould, supra note 10, at pp.25-43 to -45; Hobbs & Raley, supii note 3, at 880-81
n.209 (contrasting California's water law system with Colorado's).
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many years before the Mono Lake decision, California interpreted its constitution's "reasonable use" requirement to allow reconsideration and modification
of water rights due to changed conditions." This requirement, "which makes
California a 'hybrid' riparian/prior appropriation state, has never been the law
in Colorado's 'pure' prior appropriation system."' The Mono Lake decision
subjects virtually all California water rights to review for environmental protection, without addressing constitutional takings protection against the curtailment or abrogation of water rights.
C. CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS AFTER MONO LAKE

Mono Lake may be a unique resource, but this case was not unique; instead, it set off a statewide barrage of litigation. Environmental advocates laid
siege to water rights from virtually every major water body in the state. After
the Mono Lake decision, California leapfrogged Colorado for an uncontested
lead in water litigation. Not just Los Angeles, but a wide assortment of municipal, state and agricultural water providers had their historic water rights threatened and in some cases curtailed, to satisfy environmental demands raised
under the doctrine in water rights proceedings."'
Building on the Mono Lake case, California courts have extended the
public trust beyond navigable waterways, concluding that "public trust interests
pertain to non-navigable streams which sustain a fishery."" Under this doctrine, "Itihe state's right to protect fish is not limited to navigable or othenvise
public waters but extends to any waters where fish are habitated [sic] or accustomed to resort and through which they have the freedom of passage to and
from the public fishing grounds of the state."' While the Mono Lake court
held that the public trust doctrine may restrict new water rights or even modify
existing rights in non-navigable waters connecting to navigable waters, " California courts still recognize that to extend this doctrine to non-navigable waters, those non-navigable waters must affect a navigable waterway." Moreover,
California citizens may sue to enforce the public trust in water for the protection of ecological resources.'-"
Similar to most other Western states, California's Court of Appeal has
held California's public trust doctrine does not extend to groundwater, at least

225. Dunning, supi note 171, at 17-42.
226. Kemper v. Hamilton (In re Title, Ballot Tide, and Submission Clause for 2011-2012
#3), 274 P.3d 562, 573 (Colo. 2012) (en banc) (Hobbs,J., dissenting).
227. See Sax, supra note 212, at 271; Arthur L. Littleworth, The Pubbc Tist vs. The Pubhc
Interest,19 PAC. LJ. 1201, 1207-1223 (1988) (discussing how the public trust doctrine's application has evolved under California water law).
228. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 211 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989).
229. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
230. Mono Lke, 658 P.2d 709, 722 (Cal. 1983) (en banc).
231.
Golden Feathei, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42.
232. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 600 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008).
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absent some impact on the public use of navigable waters." However, recent
litigants have argued the public trust doctrine as a basis to restrict tributary
groundwater diversions in order to protect affected public trust resources in
surface waters of the Scott River in northern California." This assertion appears to be premised in part on a unique (for California) statute recognizing
groundwater is connected to the Scott River.'
In the aftermath of the California Supreme Court's Mono Lake decision,
litigation continued over Los Angeles's licenses to divert water from tributaries
above Mono Lake. The California Court of Appeal rejected the City's defense
of its water rights based on a statute of limitations, holding an "encroachment
on the public trust interest" may not ripen into a right shielded by such a statute." The court ordered California's State Water Resources Control Board
("SWRCB") to set appropriate limits on Los Angeles's diversions." The
SWRCB held a lengthy evidentiary hearing, and then issued its decision mandating minimum stream flows and a restored lake surface level to protect public trust resources, including air quality, water quality, recreation and views." In
so doing, "the Board recognized the public trust as an ecological baseline that
places fundamental limits on diversion of water for consumptive uses."' To
implement this decision, Los Angeles was forced to relinquish an estimated
70,900 acre-feet per year of its historical exports from the Mono Lake basin,
replacing this water with far more expensive sources of supply." Along the
way, the state legislature decided to compensate Los Angeles for its loss, authorizing thirty-six million dollars for alternative water supplies to replace onethird of the City's historic diversions."'
Much of the legal development of California's public trust limits on water
rights has occurred through both litigation and regulatory proceedings involv233. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Grp. v. San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
234. John Hedges, uCrents i62 California Water iniv: The Push to Itegrate Grounditer
and Si1,ce Water Managenent through the Courts, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 375, 396-97
(2011) (evaluating Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Evd. L. Found. v. State Water Resource
Control Bd, filed in Sacramento County Superior Court, June 23, 2010 (No. 34-20108000583), available at https://services.saccourt.com/PublicDMS/Search.aspx (search using case
number)).
235.' Id. at 396 (construing CAL. WATER CODE §2500.5(b) (West 2012)).
236. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 212 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989).
237.
Id. at 212-13; see also Ronald B. Robie, EIfective Implementation of the Public Tnist
)octrine i Califominia Water Resowrves Decision-MdAking: A View from the Bench, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1155, 1160-61 (2012).
238. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., MONO LAKE BASIN WATER RIGHT
DECISION, No. 1631, 19-20, 77, 194-95 (Sept. 28, 1994) [hereinafter SWRCB Mono Lake

D9ecioionl,

awilable

at

http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/publicationsforms/

publications/general/docs/monolake_wr.decl631_a.pdf; see also Brian Gray, Ensuring the
Pu/i/ic Trust, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 995-96 (2012).
239. Gray, supm note 238, at 997.

240.
996.

SWRCB Mono Lake Decision, supra note 238, at 163, 170; Gray, supm? note 238, at

241.

Mono Lake - Not On the Level, AQUEDUcr 2000 (Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal.),

Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 5.
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ing the San Francisco Bay Delta, a large estuary system located at the mouth of
the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, downstream from several structures
diverting an average of 5.9 million acre-feet for agriculture and municipal uses.' Not long after the 1983 Mono Lake decision, Justice Racanelli of the California Court of Appeal upheld SWRCB limits on federal and state project
diversions to implement Bay Delta water quality standards. Specifically, the
court held that the SWRCB "unquestionably possessed legal authority under
the public trust doctrine to exercise supervision over appropriators in order to
protect fish and wildlife."'
In a 2006 decision reviewing the SWRCB's later action to modify the
same conditions, the California Court of Appeal rejected an argument that
conflicts between the public trust and competing water uses must be resolved
in favor of the public trust." Consistent with the Mono Lake holding, the state
must protect the public trust resources whenever "feasible."2 "What is 'feasible,' however, is a matter for the Board [SWRCB] to deternine."2 Similarly,
in another 2006 decision involving diversions affecting the Bay Delta, the California Court of Appeal held that "every effort must be made to preserve water
right priorities to the extent those priorities do not lead to violation of the public trust doctrine. . . . [T] he subversion of water right priority is justified only if
enforcing that priority will in fact lead to the unreasonable use of water or result in harm to values protected by the public trust."'
Contemplating these recent decisions, some commentators recently have
questioned whether California's public trust doctrine is restricting water use
and protecting ecosystems to the degree contemplated by the Mono Lake decision." Professor Dave Owen finds that since that case, no other case "has set
aside an agency decision on public trust grounds, or has ordered the reexamination of an existing (or applied-for) water right." 9 Rather, California
courts show a prevailing trend of deference to the SWRCB on public trust
issues.' The SWRCB, in turn, generally considers the public trust doctrine
not in isolation, but as one factor intertwined with several other environmental
laws and mandates, given the SWRCB's regulatory role in determining, and
conditioning California water rights." The SWRCB has used the public trust
doctrine to reexamine existing rights only on "very rare occasions," instead
focusing its attention on new water rights or water users' requests for changes
242. In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Enwil. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 184
P.3d 709, 715 (Cal. 2008); Gray, supra note 238, at 999.
243. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 201-02 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
244. State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
245. Id. at 272 (quoting Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 446).
246. Id.
247. El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 49091 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
248. Gray, supiw note 238, at 974-75, 1004-06; Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the
Pubihc Trust Doctniie, and the Adnhisitrative State, 45 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 1099, 1099 (2012).
249. Owen, supia note 284, at 1122-23.
250. Id. at 1129.
251. Id. at 1135-36.
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of water rights." Professor Owen concludes that while the SWRCB's integration of public trust and other considerations has been significant, after Mono
Lake the public trust doctrine "was only marginally relevant" in California's
past thirty years of water litigation."

V. WESTERN STATE TRENDS, BEYOND CALIFORNIA AND MONO
LAKE
As California's experience shows, the public trust doctrine is malleable - it
can expand as needed to accomplish any number of environmental goals in
those states that recognize the doctrine. Indeed, the modern trend in several
Western states has been to recognize a public trust that goes beyond the historical scope of the doctrine, i.e., commerce and navigation."' This trend is
due in large part to the California Supreme Court's Marks and Mono Lake
decisions." Although the public trust doctrine is being used to pursue a wide
range of environmental goals, the greatest expansion of the doctrine over the
last thirty years remains the doctrine's application to water rights." This section
addresses developments in several Western states and examines the basis for
the doctrine in each state, in part to determine what effect the Supreme
Court's decision in PPL Montana may have on public trust doctrine jurisprudence moving forward.
A. HAWAII
Although perhaps less discussed than developments in California, Hawaii
has seen the most expansive use of the public trust doctrine in relation to water
rights." In 2000, the Hawaii Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged its adherence to NationalAudubon Society when expanding the state's public trust
to cover not only navigable waters, but groundwater as well. 2 Hawaii's public
trust doctrine, also referred to as the "water resources trust," finds its roots in
Hawaii's Constitution, which is exceptionally protective of natural resources."
Hawaii's Constitution provides:
"

For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural
resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall
promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner
252. Id. at 1134-35.
253. Id. at 1152.
254. See Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine:Assessing Its Recent Past & Chartin Its Future,45 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 665, 675 (2012).
255. Id. at 667-68, 675.
256. Id. at 675. Interestingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court, not California, should receive credit for being the first state to apply the public trust doctrine to consumptive water rights.
257. Robin Kundis Craig, Adaptng to Climate Change: The PotentialRole of State Common-LawPublic Trust Doctnnes, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 838 (2010).
258. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 452-54 (Haw. 2000) (citing Mono
Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 728 n. 27 (Cal. 1983) (en banc)).
259. Craig,supra note 257, at 840.
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consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of
the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the
benefit of the people."'
Further defining its public trust as one of the most environmentally protective, the Hawaii Supreme Court held in 2006 that Clean Water Act discharge
permits are subject to the state public trust and the issuing department, the
Hawaii Department of Health, must consider the trust when issuing permits.2
Hawaii undoubtedly treats private rights to water with suspicion, and the public
interest in water takes precedence over private interests. The Hawaii Supreme
Court reasoned in 2000 "the public trust has never been understood to safeguard rights of exclusive use for private commercial gain.".. Further, current
and past diversion decisions, as in California, are subject to retroactive application of the trust and courts may make modifications in order to benefit the
public interest in the water."
6

B. MONTANA

Similarly, Montana courts have found the basis of a robust public trust in
that state's constitution, which provides that "all waters are owned by the State
for the use of its people."" Montana's public trust doctrine has a strong connection with public access to Montana's streams and rivers. The courts have
established a "recreational use" test to determine which waters are subject to
recreational access." It is important to note that while the public has the ability
to access any water, navigable or non-navigable for fishing, the public cannot
cross private property to access the stream."" Also, there is no public ownership of the beds or banks of non-navigable streams, just the water itself, but
incidental use of privately owned bed or banks of waterways is allowed."
While access to water is an important component of the Montana public trust
doctrine by statute, established water rights still trump any other use of water,
including environmental protection and public uses."'
The Supreme Court's narrower construction of navigability in the PPL
Montana decision clearly dealt a blow to Montana's assumptions of tide to
streambeds, and its linked assertion of a public trust in those streams. It remains to be seen how this decision will influence the Montana Supreme
Court's application of the public trust doctrine in other contexts.
260. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
261. Kelly v. 1250 OceansidePartners,140 P.3d 985, 1009 (Haw. 2006).
262. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 450.
263. Id. at 452.
264. Galt v. Montana, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987).
265. Mont. Coal. For Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984), overruledon other grounds byGray v. City of Billings, 689 P.2d 268, 272 (Mont. 1984).
266. Id.
267. Galt, 731 P.2d at 915.
268. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparadve Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctines: Publc Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an EcologicalPubhlic Trus4 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 78 (2010) [hereinafter Craig, Comparative Guide] (citing Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 75-5-705, 75-7-104, 85-1-111 (2009)).
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In other states such as Idaho and Arizona, public policy favors private water rights and therefore those states' legislative bodies have attempted, with
varying degrees of success, to curb any judicial trend toward a more robust
public trust doctrine.""
C. IDAHO
A series of Idaho Supreme Court decisions during the 1980s and early
1990s followed California's lead in NationalAudubon Society and adopted
the rule that "It]he public trust doctrine takes precedent even over vested water
rights."". The Idaho Legislature was apparently of a different mind on this
point, however, and passed legislation in 1996 to limit the public trust doctrine
to be "solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the
title to the beds of navigable waters," and not to apply to appropriation."'
The Idaho Legislature's move to curb the public trust spurred debate in
the academic community as to whether the public trust doctrine is a common
law concept amendable by the legislature, or a constitutional principle beyond
the legislature's reach. The murky underpinnings of the public trust doctrine
fueled the debate (as discussed above); without knowing the basis for the doctrine, it was challenging to analyze the legislature's power to limit the doctrine."' Relying on Ilhois Cenial,several commentators cane to the conclusion that the doctrine was at the very least "quasi-constitutional" and so inherently tied to state sovereignty that the states were without authority to limit or
diminish its application."
Of course, PPL Montana lays to rest much of the debate about the states'
ability to define or limit the public trust doctrine. Because the Supreme Court
has now clarified that the doctrine is a creature of state law, the Idaho Legislature's preference for the protection and exercise of private water rights over
any later asserted public interest in those waters is far less contentious than it
was in 1996.
D. ARIZONA

A similar legislative tug of war has occurred in Arizona, where the Arizona
courts have had the last word in defining the public trust doctrine as "a constitutional limitation on legislative power to give away resources held by the state
in trust for its people."" Consequently, in the words of the Arizona Supreme
269. See id. at 76, 80, 92.
270. Idaho Conservation League v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995); Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983).
271. IDAHO CODEANN. §§ 58-1203(1), (2)(b)-(c) (1996).
272. See James M. Kearney, Recent Statute: Closihg the Floodgates?Idahos Statutoiy hnitation on the Pubhc Trust Doctne, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 91, 113 (1997).
273. Id.; Michael C. Blumm & Scott W. Reed, Renoucing the Public Tust Doctane:An
Assessment ofthe Validity ofIdaho HouseBill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 483 (1997).

274. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179,
199 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (citing Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837
P.2d 158, 166-68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)).

Issue 1I

COLORADO PUBLIC TRUST DOC7RINE

81

Court, "[tihe Legislature cannot by legislation destroy the constitutional limits
on its authority."'m Accordingly, an Arizona statute limits the public trust doctrine to the extent it can: it is applicable only to navigable waters as defined
under the equal-footing doctrine and is limited to the three traditional uses of
commerce, navigation, and fishing.'
As noted above, the Arizona Supreme Court has been unwilling to accept
that Arizona's rivers are largely non-navigable without a case-by-case analysis of
the state's streams. Thus, the Arizona legislature created the Arizona Navigable Stream Adjudication Commission ("NSAC") and charged it with the duty
of determining the navigability of the streams throughout the state.' The Arizona Legislature passed legislation that provides compensation to landowners
who lose tide due to the navigability determinations of the NSAC." Additionally, Arizona's land department may release from the public trust waters
deemed subject to it upon request and hearing." The US Supreme Court's
clarification of the public trust doctrine's state law underpinning in PPL Montana may prompt a reevaluation of Arizona's evolving statutory framework
regarding navigability determinations and application of the public trust doctrine to the extent the Arizona courts have in the past relied heavily on Illinois
Central, which was viewed as binding federal constitutional precedent." Like
Montana, Arizona may need to reconsider the reach of its public trust and title
assertions.

VI. THE PUBLIC TRUST BALLOT INITIATIVES IN COLORADO
Since 1994, Richard Hamilton of Park County (a microbiologist and former lobbyist for environmental groups) has been the driving force behind a
series of statewide ballot initiatives seeking to amend Colorado's constitution
to impose a public trust doctrine on Colorado waters." While none of these
proposals to date have appeared on the ballot for voters' consideration, most
have been through the state's ballot title setting process, and the Colorado
Supreme Court has reviewed some of the resulting titles."

275.

Id.

276.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 0 37-1101(5), (9) (West).
277.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
278. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 37-1128(A) (2012).
279.
Id. 37-1132(A)(1)-(3).
280.
Id. 37-1151(A).
281.
See, e.g., Defenders of Wdhfe, 18 P.3d at 727-28; Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166-68 (Ariz. Ct. App.1991); see also Craig, Comparative Guide,
supra note 268, at 104 ("Arizona courts view the public trust doctrine as a kdenJconstitutional
issue. . . .") (emphasis added).
282.
Patrick Malone, Water Initiatives Ain to Erase Exising Regls, PUEBLO CHIEFrAIN
(Jan.
5,
2012),
http://www.chieftain.com/news/local/water-initiatives-ainm-to-erase-existingrights/article 2907f744-376a-l 1e l-9798-0019bb2963f4.html.
283. Colorado law provides for the Colorado Supreme Court's expedited review of certain
determinations by the state's ballot title setting board ("Tide Board") on statewide initiatives.
COLO. REV. STAT. S 1-40-107(2) (2012).
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A. PREVIOUS PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The first such initiatives, proposed in 1994 and 1995, had many features.
First and foremost, they would require Colorado to "adopt and defend a
strongpubhlic trust doctrine regarding the public's rights and ownerships in and
of the waters in Colorado."" While the "strong public trust doctrine" was not
defined in these measures, Mr. Hamilton was not shy in explaining what he
understood it to mean. He suggested it would go at least as far as California's
doctrine, relying especially on the Marks, City of Berkeley, and the Mono
Lake cases discussed above.'" In 1994, the Colorado Supreme Court declined
to adopt the proponents' interpretation of the meaning of this phrase, holding
that "any intent of the proponents not adequately expressed in the language of
the measure will not govern [courts'] construction.

. .

. The phrase 'strong pub-

lic trust doctrine,' therefore, does not necessarily carry the specialized meaning
propounded by the proponents." Thus, if such an initiative is adopted, it will
remain for the courts to sort out its meaning.
The second clause of these early initiatives would require the State to
"protect and defend the public's interests in waters from unwarrantedor othermse narrow definitions of its waters as private property."." Mr. Hamilton
says this is to "insist that our public waters never be defined as private property."" If thus interpreted, this provision would fly in the face of the longstanding
Colorado principle that appropriation creates a "most valuable property right"
in the exclusive use of water,'" requiring the State to defend against the very
rights it has always approved and defended. This provision also requires the
state to act against private owners, contrary to the traditional public trust doctrine, which restrained the state's powers.
The final section of these initiatives provided for public ownership,
through the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"), of waters dedicated to instream or in-lake uses. Any "ownership in the rights of use of waters" could be decreed to such public use, and the CWCB would be required
to accept, protect and defend such dedications as an element of the public
284. MacRavey v. Hamilton (In re Tide, Ballot Tide, Submission Clause, and Summary
Adopted April 5, 1995) (Pubhlic Rhts 1), 898 P.2d 1076, 1077 n.1 (Colo. 1995) (en banc)
(quoting 1995 proposed initiative "Public Rights in Waters II," by Richard Hamilton and
Jeanne Englert); MacRavey v. Swingle (In re Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and Summary Adopted April 6, 1994) (In re Water Rihts Initntive), 877 P.2d 321, 324-25 (Colo. 1994)
(en banc) (quoting 1994 proposed initiative "Give the Vote on Water," by Richard Hamilton
and Jerry Swingle) (emphasis added).
285. See Answering Brief for Respondent at 6-10, In re Water Rights Initiative, 877 P.2d
321 (Colo. 1994) (No. 94SA149), 1994 WL 16058752, [hereinafter Hamilton BneA.
286. In re Water Rihts Initiative,877 P.2d at 327.
287. Pubhlic Rghts 11 898 P.2d at 1077 n.1; In re Water Rhts Initiative, 877 P.2d at 324
(emphasis added).
288. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 9, MacRavey v. Swingle, 877 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1994) (en
banc) (No. 94SAl49), 1994 WL 16058755 (citing Hamilton Bnef supra note 285, Exhibit H at
2).
289. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377-78 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); see also
Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 369 P.2d 557, 559-60 (Colo. 1962) (en banc);
Nichols v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 280 (Colo. 1893).
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trust." This section would greatly alter the CWCB's "instream flow" ("ISF")
program, which protects instrearn uses and natural lake levels, within the confines of the appropriation system." The CWCB may appropriate new water
rights for instream flow, and may acquire existing senior rights to convert their
historic use to instream flow." Such use by the CWCB is deemed "beneficial
use," to the extent it is required "to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree."".. Because the CWCB is also charged with promoting use of
the water to which Colorado is entitled by interstate compacts and apportionments, it is ideally suited to determine how much instream flow is required
and reasonable, in light of the other uses precluded thereby."'
In November 1994, voters amended the Colorado Constitution by referendum to require that no initiative contain more than one subject." The 1994
and 1995 initiatives also contained provisions that would substantially alter the
law governing water conservancy districts, imposing new requirements for elections on those districts' board members and boundary changes." Based on the
new constitutional requirement, the Colorado Supreme Court held in 1995
that these election requirements constituted a separate subject from the public
trust and water rights provisions, so that no title could be set for the ballot."'
"The public trust water rights paragraphs of the Initiative impose obligations
on the state of Colorado to recognize and protect public ownership of water,"
matters over which the "water conservancy .. . districts have little or no power"
and "[t]he common characteristic that the paragraphs all involve 'water' is too
general and too broad to constitute a single subject. . . ."'
In 1996, Mr. Hamilton and Phillip Hufford proposed a similar constitutional amendment, including the mandate for a public trust doctrine (omitting
the adjective "strong") and a provision controlling public dedication of water
rights for in-stream use, but eliminating the district election requirements from
Hamilton's earlier proposals." The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the title
for this initiative, holding that the "public trust" and water rights provisions
were sufficiently related to constitute a-single subject, but declined to interpret
the meaning or effect of those provisions." Hamilton and Englert submitted a
290. PublicRights11 898 P.2d at 1077 n. 1; In re WaterRghts Initiative,877 P.2d at 324-25.
291. See Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. Colo. Water Conserv. Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 577
(Colo. 1979) (en banc); Steven Sims, Colorado'sInstream Flow Program:IntegratingInstream
Flow Protection Into a PiorAppropiation System, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION INTHE
WEST 12-1, 12-1 to -2 (Lawvrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., U. Colo. Nat. Resources Law Center rev. ed. 1993).
292. COLO. REv. STAT. §37-92-102(3) (2012).
293. Id. § 37-92-102(4).
294. See Sims, supranote 291, at 12-10 to -11.
295. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5.5).
296. Public Rights 11 898 P.2d 1076, 1077 n.1 (Colo. 1995) (en banc); In re Water Rights
Initiative, 877 P.2d 321, 324 (Colo. 1994) (en banc).
297. PublicRights l1,898 P.2d at 1078-80.
298. Id at 1080.
299. MacRavey v. Hufford (In re Tide, Ballot Tide, Submission Clause, and Summary
Adopted March 20, 1996), 917 P.2d 1277, 1278 n.2 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (quoting 1996
proposed initiative "1996-6," by T. Philip Hufford and Richard Hamilton).
300. Id. at 1280-81.
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similar measure in 2002 for tide setting, but no petition was filed for review by
the Supreme Court."
In 2007, Mr. Hamilton and Phillip Doe proposed a constitutional
amendment with a different emphasis: the creation of a new state "Department of Environmental Conservation.". The measure would give this department "ItIrust responsibilities" to favor "public ownerships and public values" over competing economic interests." In an opinion by Justice Hobbs, a
majority of the Colorado Supreme Court held that this "mandatory public
trust standard for agency decision-making," to be imposed on existing state
bodies that would be merged into the new department, was "a variation on"
the subject of the "public trust doctrine" previously proposed in the initiatives
discussed above. This public trust standard was "coiled in the folds of the
measure," presenting "the danger of voter surprise and fraud" that the singlesubject requirement for initiatives seeks to avoid.' Thus, the combination of
this standard into the measure violated the requirement, so the measure was
not a proper initiative."
B. INITIATIVES 3 AND 45 (2012)

In 2012, a pair of proposed initiatives again focused the attention of Colorado's water community and news media on the public trust doctrine. Mr.
Hamilton and Mr. Doe concurrently proposed Initiatives 3 and 45, both to
amend water provisions of the Colorado Constitution." Tides were set for
both measures, and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld them in split decisions." The proponents then circulated petitions for both measures, but did
not obtain the requisite number of signatures to qualify for the statewide ballot.,"
Initiative 3 proposed to amend section 5 of Article XVI, the constitution's
section declaring unappropriated water to be "property of the public," adding
provisions to adopt and define a "Colorado public trust doctrine" that would
protect public ownership rights and interests in the water of natural streams,
while giving "the public's estate in water in Colorado ... legal authority superior to rules and terms of contracts or property law."." In contrast, the initiative
301.

Richard C. Hamilton &Jeanne W. Englert, Public Ownership and Use of Water, Colo.

Initiative 2001-2002 No. 135 (proposed May 1, 2002).
302. Kemper v. Hamilton (In re Title, Ballot Tide, and Submission Clause, For 2007-08,

#17), 172 P.3d 871 app. B at 880 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
303. Id. app. B § 7 at 883.
304. I. at 874-75.
305. I. at 875-76.
306. kI. at 876.
307. Kemper v. Hamilton (In re Title For 2011-2012 #3) (In re 7tle for ##, 274 P.3d 562
app. at 568 (Colo. 2012) (en banc); Kemper v. Hamilton (In re Title For 2011-2012 #45) (In re
7ie for #4),274 P.3(1 576 app. at 582 (Colo. 2012) (en banc).
308. Ire 77tle for #3, 274 P.3d at 562; I eitle for #4j 274 P.3d at 576.
309. See COLO. CONST. art. V, §1(2) (specifying the formula to determine the required
number

of

signatures

for

initiative

petitions);

http://protectcoloradowater.org (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
238. Inre 7de for #3, 274 P.3d 562 app. § 5(2)-(3) at 568.

Protect

Colorado

Water,
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defined appropriation water rights as "servient to the public's dominant water
estate" and subject to the public trust doctrine, to be "managed by the state
government, acting as steward of the public's water, so as to protect the natural
environment and to protect the public's enjoyment and use of water.""' The
initiative mandated the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of state
government to enforce these provisions, acting "as stewards to protect the public's interests in its water estate," and authorized citizens to sue to enforce these
mandates." .
Unlike Mr. Hamilton's earlier public trust proposals, Initiative 3 expressly
addressed stream access, providing for "access by the public along, and on, the
wetted natural perimeter of a stream bank of a water course of any natural
stream in Colorado," as a "navigation servitude for commerce and public use
as recognized in the Colorado public trust doctrine.". These provisions
sought to overturni the primary holding of People v. Emmert," echoing themes
from legislation and initiatives introduced in 2010, when river outfitters
pressed their case for a "right to float" without liability for trespass."'
However, a majority of the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the title set
for Initiative 3, rejecting arguments that the measure encompassed separate
subjects by both subordinating water rights and transferring rights in land under streams."' The court held that the initiative's various provisions all related
to "the public's rights in the waters of natural streams" via the proposed adoption of a "Colorado public trust doctrine" as a "new legal regime" to address
water rights, property rights, and stream access."' The majority opinion distinguished the court's previous decisions that Mr. Hamilton's 1995 and 2007
measures violated the single-subject requirement, stating that unlike those
measures, the provisions in Initiative 3 "all relate to the 'Colorado public trust
doctrine' and that doctrine's impact on the 'public's rights in waters of natural
streams.""'"

Justice Hobbs dissented from the single-subject holding,'noting that a voter could casually read Initiative 3 "as a reaflirmation of Colorado's longstanding water law doctrine, which provides that the water resource is always owned
by the public, subject to .. . use rights created in priority through appropriations of unappropriated water by public and private entities. However, within

311.

Id. app. § 5(4)(a), (c) at 568-69.

312.

Id. app. S 5(6) at 569.

313. Id. app. S 5(5)(a) at 569.
314. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (citing More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437 (1977) (en banc); Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685 (1906); Hanlon v. Hobson,
51 P. 433 (1897)) ("[TIhe land underlying non-navigable streams is the suhject of private ownership and is vested in the proprietors of the adjoining lands.").
315. See H.B. 10-1188, 67th Cen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010); Use of Colorado
Water Streams, Colo. Initiative 2009-2010 No. 87 (proposed Apr. 9, 2010); Use of Colorado
Water Streams, Colo. Initiative 2009-2010 No. 88 (proposed Apr. 9, 2010); Use of Colorado
Water Streams, Colo. Initiative 2009-2010 No. 89 (proposed Apr. 9, 2010); Use of Colorado
Water Streams, Colo. Initiative 2009-2010 No. 90 (proposed Apr. 9, 2010).

316.

Ine Tide lbr #3, 274 P.3d at 566-68.

317.
318.

Id. at 567.
I.
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the folds of this complex initiative are coiled three separate and discrete subjects. ... "m He explained that the measure would (i) "subordinate all existing
water rights in Colorado created over the past 150 years to a newly created
dominant water estate"; (ii) "vest in the public possessory rights to the beds
and banks of the stream now owned by local public entities and private landowners in Colorado"; and (iii) "vest a recreational easement in the public
across all private property in Colorado through which even a trickle of water
runs," abrogating private property owners' right to prohibit trespass across
their land. "These three subject matters separately and together propose to
drop what amounts to a nuclear bomb on Colorado water rights and land
rights.""
In his dissent, Justice Hobbs then explained the doctrinal framework of
public trust law and other matters addressed by the initiative, including the
"two different subjects" of non-navigable stream title and public trust theory
addressed in the Ennnert case, and the PPL Montana decision's distinction
between federal law determining navigability for title and state law detennining
"the existence and scope of the public trust doctrine."' He traced the English
common-law origins of the public trust doctrine and the separate lineage of
some states' creation of public rights "to use waters for fishing and navigation
regardless of title and regardless of whether the waters were ever navigable for
title," which New Mexico and California courts had derived from Native
American and Mexican law." In contrast from the roots of both doctrines,
Colorado has completely broken from the common law of water, making all
surface water and groundwater "a public resource dedicated to the establishment and exercise of water use rights created in accordance with applicable
law. The 'Colorado Doctrine' arose from the 'imperative necessity' of water
scarcity in the western region, and ... created a property-rights-based allocation
and administration system that promotes multiple use of a finite resource for
beneficial purposes.""
In concluding his analysis, Justice Hobbs observed that Initiative 3 "appears to seek to overturn all aspects of Emmert, and goes farther by creating a
'public trust' not only in all water rights in the state, as with California's Mono
Lake case, but also in all natural stream beds regardless of navigability, which
would be a novelty among jurisdictions in the United States.".' Despite the
majority's reluctance to analyze the measure's substance in applying the singlesubject requirement, Justice Hobbs's insightful explanation of the separate
evolution of the common-law public trust and the "Colorado doctrine" confirms that the roots of the public trust and public ownership doctrines are quite

319.

320.
321.

Id. at 571 (Hobbs, J., dissenting).

Id. at 571-72.
Iclat 572.
322. Id. at 572-73 (citing Mono L"ke, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983) (en banc); State ex rel.
State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2(1 421, 432 (N.M. 1945)).
323. Id. at 573-74 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP, 45
P.3d 693, 706 (Colo. 2002) (en banc)).
324. Id. at 574.
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foreign to Colorado law, and that the terms of Initiative 3 would depart even
further from Colorado's longstanding legal framework to address water issues.
Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Doe concurrently proposed Initiative 45, to amend
section 6 of Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution (the section protecting
the right to divert unappropriated water to beneficial use by appropriation).
The initiative would amend the current text of section 6, deleting words that
limit the diversion tight to "unappropriated" waters of "natural stream Is]," thus
extending that right to "any water within the state of Colorado."" It would then
add several provisions, most of them limiting the appropriation right in terms
similar to Initiative 3, but without using that measure's central phrase, "public
trust doctrine." Echoing the "public trust" statements of the companion measure, Initiative 45 provides for diversions to be limited or curtailed "to protect
natural elements of the public's dominant water estate.""' Going beyond Initiative 3, it requires that water diversion rights "shall require the water use appropriator to return water unimpaired to the public, after use, so as to protect the
natural environment and the public's use and enjoyment of waters.
In a split decision, the Title Board determined that Initiative 45 contained
a single subject. A majority of the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed this decision, with Justice Hobbs again dissenting.' The majority found that the subject
"public control of waters" accurately described the initiative's scope, as the
initiative's primary features would extend public control to all Colorado water
through a publicly controlled, "dominant water estate."" Water use rights
would be subordinated to this dominant estate through several provisions,
including the requirement "to return used water unimpaired to the public.".
In his dissent, Justice Hobbs noted three subjects "concealed within the
folds of this complex initiative."' First, like Initiative 3, it would "subordinate
all existing water rights in Colorado created over the past 150 years to a newly
created dominant water estate" by creating "a super water right" for environmental protection and public use." Second, by deleting the restriction on appropriation to "unappropriated waters of any natural stream," it would "allow
non-tributary groundwater to be appropriated by anyone without the consent
of the overlying landowner.""' Finally, Initiative 45 would "impose riparian
water law upon the State of Colorado and upon already appropriated water
rights, by requiring that the appropriator must return the water to the steam
unimpaired.""
Elaborating this last point, Justice Hobbs explained that the requirement
to return-water unimpaired was central to common law rights of riparian own325. In re 77de for #4 274 P.3d 576 app. at 582-83 (Colo. 2012) (en banc) (quoting text of
Proposed Initiative 2011-12 #45, Sl).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 583.
328. See id. at 576.
329. Id. at 581.
330. Id.at580-81.
331. Id., 274 P.3d at 586 (Hobbsj., dissenting).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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ers to water in streams, the very legal framework Colorado rejected in adopting
a prior appropriation doctrine."' Such a return requirement, he pointed out,
would defeat the rights to develop and consume water that Colorado has diligently reserved in its interstate water compacts and equitable apportionment
decrees.C. IMPACT7S OF THE PROPOSALS
How would the public trust doctrine as proposed in these initiatives transform Colorado law? With each of these proposals, Mr. Hamilton has suggested his version of the doctrine would go at least as far as California's doctrine,
relying especially on the Marks v. Whitney and Mono Lake cases discussed
above." Under the common law cases, the doctrine is limited to protection of
tidal and navigable waterways, which California may extend to restricting diversions from their non-navigable tributaries." Initiative 3, however, would extend
to allwaters in the state, perhaps due to Colorado's recognition that it has no
navigable streams. If such an initiative extends its protection to all the waters in
Colorado, it would be the most radical extension of the public trust doctrine
yet, severing the doctrine completely from its historic anchor of navigability.
This would revolutionize water rights in Colorado, more than anything in over
150 years.
At the very least, such an initiative would dramatically increase litigation
over Colorado water rights. The proponents intend it to apply not only in determinations of new water rights, but also to force reconsideration of rights
previously decreed, as in the Mono Lake case." Because a public trust doctrine has never been defined in Colorado, and has taken various different
common law meanings elsewhere, "its meaning and content can only be determined through years of lawsuits.""' In essence, Initiative 3 (like its predecessors) would grant enormous power over water rights to the judiciary, with hardly any standards constraining that power. Such raw judicial power undercuts
not only property rights, but also the basic principles of democratic governmient."' Moreover, the prospect of such broad based, standardless litigation
destroys the fundamental certainty provided by property rights in general and
prior appropriation water rights in particular."'

Id. at 585 (citing United States v.Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 744-45 (1950)).
Id. at 586 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 118 (1907)).
See, e.g., Opening Brief of Respondent Richard G. Hamilton at 15-18, In re Title,
Tide, Submission Clause for the Proposed Initiative 2011-2012 No. 3, 274 P.3d 562
http://www.courts.state.co.us/
at
available
banc),
(en
2012)
Courts/SupremeCourt/20 11 Initiatives.cfm; Answering Brief of Respondent Richard G. Hamilton at 6-10, In re Title, Ballot Tide, Submission Clause, and Summary Adopted April 6, 1994,
877 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (No. 16058752), 1994 WL 16058752.
338. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).
339. See, e.g., Opening Brief of Respondent Richard G. Hamilton, supm note 337; Answering Brief of Respondent Richard G. Hamilton, supra note 337, at 9-10.
340. Gould, supra note 10, at 18.
341. See Huffinan, Fish Out ofWalet; supra note 11, at 554, 566.
342. See Gould, supn? note 10, at 18.
335.
336.
337.
Ballot
(Colo.
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Owners and users of all water diverted and stored in Colorado would be at
risk. All diversion and storage projects are planned, financed, and completed
based on assumptions the priority system applies, and that a certain volume of
water can be diverted or stored whenever available in priority. A public trust,
however, would render all these rights subject to potential curtailment or revocation-not just by water shortage, senior rights or non-use, but by the state's or
a judge's subjective determination that one use has become more valuable
than another. This intolerable level of uncertainty could make it virtually impossible to plan or finance a significant water project, and might jeopardize the
financing of many projects that have been built but not yet paid off.
Like other modern advocates of the public trust doctrine, Mr. Hamilton
has sought to use the doctrine proposed in his initiatives to enable staterequired transfers of private rights to public use, without the owners' consent
and without compensation. Mr. Hamilton said to Legislative Council staff in
1994: "Do the proponents intend that the courts, in upholding a 'public trust
doctrine,' will have the authority to transferexisting privatelyheld ights to the
public? And the answer is that yes, we do.""
To the next question, " Without the consent of the individuals who may
have the right to use that water at the moment?," Mr. Hamilton answered,
" Yeah.""" Mr. Hamilton went on to describe California's City of Berkeley decision, saying these forced transfers of private rights to the public would be
without compensation." However, not even an amendment to Colorado's
Constitution can take, without compensation, property rights protected by the
US Constitution. A newly adopted state constitutional provision "cannot be
the basis for asserting that a public right has existed since statehood."" Colorado water rights have always been recognized as property rights, have never
been limited by a public trust, and cannot be so limited retroactively, absent
just compensation. Thus, the transfers contemplated by Mr. Hamilton would
subject the State to enormous liability for takings.
Moreover, the cost of these measures would be enormous. In 1994, the
CWCB estimated it would need to spend an additional $750,000 to
$16,600,000 for litigation and administrative requirements imposed by the first
public trust initiative. In 1996, the Office of State Planning and Budgeting
estimated "the total annual fiscal impact to state government would be
$12,295,000" from the 1996 version of Hamilton's proposed amendment."' In
addition, local governments (cities, towns, and districts) own many or most of
the water rights impacted by these initiatives, and would also face huge litiga343.
In Re The ProposedConstitutionalAmendment: "Vote on Water" Belbre Colo. Gen.
Assemb., Legis5. Counciland die Oflice of Les. Legd Services, 1994 Leg., 50' Sess. at 42 (Co.
1994) (emphasis added).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 46; see also Title v. Swingle, 877 P.2d 321, 328 (Colo. 1994) (en banc).
346.
See Huffinan, Fish Out of Wate,; supra note 11, at 547.
347.
Letter from Daries C. Lile, Director, Colorado Water Conservation Board, to Ronald
W. Cattany, Deputy Director, Colorado Department of Natural Resources (Mar. 15, 1994) (on
file with U. DENV. WATER L. REV.).
348.
Letter from George H. Delaney, Director, Office of State Planning and Budgeting, to
Victoria Buckley, Secretary of State (Feb. 29, 1996) (on file wits U. DENV. WATER L. REV.).
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tion expenses." In 1996, the Department of Local Affairs estimated the very
uncertain net fiscal impacts of the initiative to local governments in Colorado
could range from $2.28 to $3.36 billon, not including "litigation and other
ancillary expenses that could result from the measure."," While the state did
not release fiscal impact estimates for Initiative 3," surely the cost in 2012 dollars would be much greater. In these days of the TABOR Amendment and
other constraints and mandates on state and local government spending, surely
there are better uses for scarce public funds.

VII. THE "MODERN" PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS
EFFECTS
A. AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE

California's public trust doctrine is hardly concerned with navigation or
commerce. Navigability may still serve as a pre-textual hook on which to hang
the justification for a public trust, but today, environmentalists invoke the public trust doctrine to preserve, protect, or restore natural environments, and
ecosystems. This is a far cry from the traditional public trust doctrine, which
"focuses on preservation not reallocation of rights.""
These environmental goals are increasingly desirable to the public, but
they are public policy goals best resolved by legislation after public debate,
considering the most appropriate solution for each resource, with due regard
for property rights. Extension of the public trust doctrine, by contrast, is judicial sleight of hand; its rationale (far afield from its roots) is that environmental
concerns deserve the same nature and level of protection as public access to
water bodies historically used for navigation. Navigational and environmental
uses, however, are not cut of the same cloth. To put the clothes of navigation,
developed over hundreds of years, suddenly onto the body of environmentalism and preservationism, the cause du jour, bypasses property rights and the
democratic process.

349. See Swingle, 877 P.2d at 326.
350. Letter from Larry Kallenberger, Executive Director, Department of Local Affairs, to
Victoria Buckley, Secretary of State (Mar. 1, 1996) (on file with author).
351. Colorado law was amended in 2000, removing the requirement for the Title Board to
prepare a summary including a statement of fiscal impacts. S.B. 00-172, 62nd Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2000). Instead, fiscal impact estimates are prepared for the "Blue Book" at a
later stage of the initiative process. COLO. REV. STAT. S 1-40-124.5 (2012). The proponents of
Initiatives 3 and 45 announced they would not submit signatures on July 20, 2012, just before
Legislative Council staff was to release draft fiscal impact estimates as part of the Blue Book
Water Ballot Initiatives are Withdrawn,
drafting process. See Cathy Proctor,
AM),
11:56
23,
2012,
(July
JOURNAL
BUSINESS
DENVER
http://www.bizjournals.com/dlenver/news/2012/07/23/water-ballot-initiatives-are-withdrawn.html.
352. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Tist Doctine: A Conselvative Reconstruction
& Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. LJ. 47, 67 (2006).
353. Huffman, Fish Out of Water, supra note 11, at 567 ("How easy it is to turn a limitation
on government power into a justification for expansion. And how utterly unprincipled.").
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B. TAKINGS IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Federal law does not prevent state governments from condemning water
rights to solve environmental problems.' However, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution (and typically similar state constitutional provisions"), just compensation must be paid for taking a property
right. If California had been forced to compensate Los Angeles for taking the
city's water, the state would have been forced to price and prioritize environmental values. The public is much more willing to sacrifice others' property
rights when taxpayers do not have to pay.
"[Ilt is clear that the avoidance of takings problems is a major attraction to
those advancing the public trust doctrine. Some advocates of the doctrine are
quite frank about this."" The Supreme Court's ruling in Lucas v. South Carolina CoastalCommission, briefly gave private property advocates hope that the
courts would more readily recognize regulatory takings claims." The result of
Lucas, however, was the recognition of "background principles" of state common law that could defeat a takings claim." Since Lucas, commentators have
introduced the notion that the public trust doctrine should be recognized as a
"background principle" to defend against potential claims for takings of water
rights in states that recognize the doctrine."
1. Lucas and the Public Trust Doctrine as a "Background Principle"
The private property owner who brought suit in Lucas purchased two parcels of land on one of South Carolina's Barrier Islands, intending to develop
homes like those already built on the island." The following year, before Lucas could build, the South Carolina legislature passed the Beachfront Man-

354. A Colorado statute prohibits condemnation for the CWCB minimum streamflow program. COLO. REv. STAT. S 37-92-102(3)(d) (2012). This restrictive Colorado statute draws into
question whether Colorado may condemn water rights for public trust type preservation purposes.
355. Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. V.; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, S 1 with COLo. CONST.
art. II, § 15. The provision in Article II, Section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, in fact, is
broader:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without
just compensation. . . . and until the same shall be paid to the owner, . . . the
property shall not be needlessly disturbed, or the proprietary rights of the owner
therein divested; and whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a
use disturbed, or the proprietary rights of the owner therein divested; and whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public,
the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial
question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that
the use is public. (emphasis added).
356. Gould, supra note 10, at 25-19.
357. Seegenei/y Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
358. Id. at 1031.
359. E.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas 3 Unlikely Lgacy: The Ri:se of BackgroundPinciplesas CategoncalTakirngsDefenses,29 Harv. Envl. L. Rev. 321, 343-44 (2005).
360. Id. at 1006-07.
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agement Act, which barred the type of construction Lucas had planned. The
South Carolina trial court held that the Act resulted in a per se taking as Lucas's property was now worthless and awarded 1.2 million dollars in compen-

sation." The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed under the novel theory
that it was under an obligation to accept the legislature's proposed reasoning
for the Act, and therefore, the Act had transformed Lucas's building and development plans into a "public nuisance."" Citing the well-established principle that when regulation "is designed 'to prevent serious public harm,' . . . no

compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation's
effect on the property's value," the Court reversed and found in favor of the
State.'
The US Supreme Court rejected the South Carolina Supreme Court's
reasoning because determining whether regulations are meant to prevent serious harm or advance the public interest is difficult when the only difference
between the two concepts is the perspective of the interpreting party." Instead,
the Court returned to the underpinnings of takings law, noting that two discrete categories of regulatory action are compensable without case-specific
inquiry into the "public interest advanced in support of the restraint."' Those
two categories are (i) an actual physical invasion, no matter how minute;" and
(ii) a regulation that "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land.""
From there, the Court charted new territory in its regulatory takings jurisprudence. Beginning with the underlying principle that the Fifth Amendment
is violated "when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land,'"" the
Court delved into the difficulties of inquiring into government's motivations
for regulation. In balancing state interests against private ownership, the Court
recognized the following:
[Alffirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact that regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use-typically, as here, by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state--carry with them a heightened risk that private

361. Id.at1007.
362. Id. at 1007, 1009.
363. Id. at 1009-10.
364. Id. at 1010 (citing Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1991),
rev'd,Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
365. Id. at 1020-22.
366. Id. at 1015.
367. Id. (citing, e.g., Loretto v. Telemprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (imposition of a navigational
servitude upon private marina)).
368. Id. (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Nollan v. CA Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264,
295-296 (1981)).
369. Id. at 1016 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Agns, 447 U.S. at 260).
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property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm."'
The Court then held that if the State seeks to claim the activity is in some
part a public nuisance to resist compensation, it must be able to identify background principles of law to show the property owner never actually held the
right to conduct the activity in question."' The Court reasoned the State could
show the property owner had truly lost nothing only by demonstrating that the
proscribed activity was already forbidden."' The Court then reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion."
2. Colorado's Public Trust Initiatives and the Issue of Takings
Understandably, property rights advocates saw cause for celebration after
Lucas. The case presented total economic loss as a new categorical takings rule
and was a victory for a property rights owner, only the second of its kind in the
history of regulatory takings jurisprudence."' The victory was short-lived, however, as the Court subsequently backed away from a categorical approach to
regulatory takings in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island" and Tahoe-Sicir Pires.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe RegionalPuynngAgency."' retuming insteadtojustice
Brennan'5 nulti-actr balancinganalysis, Arst estabhshed in Penn Central"'
Ironically, the aftermath of Lucas has still provided proponents of the public
trust doctrine ample hope that courts will rely on the doctrine as a background
principle (at least of California water and property law) under Lucas to reject
takings claims arising from regulatory restrictions on water use."'
However, the public trust doctrine's effect, as a background principle of
property law, depends entirely on its historical extent in state law, as PPL
Montana makes clear. In Colorado, the public trust doctrine has never before
existed. Here, adopting a public trust doctrine would "take" water rights and
other property and would require compensation to those whose rights are
taken or damaged."' The US Supreme Court stated, "[Tihe government's

370. Id. at 1018 (citing Annicelli v. S. Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 140-41 (R.I. 1983) (prohibition on construction adjacent to beach justified on twin grounds of safety and "conservation of
open space"); Morris Cnty. Lind Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 193 A.2d
232, 240 (NJ. 1963) (prohibition on filling marshlands imposed in order to preserve region as
water detention basin and create wildlife refuge)).
371. Id. at 1031-32.
372. Id. at 1032.
373. Id. at 1032.
374.

Michael C. Blumm, Palazzolo and the Declne offustice Scaas Categorical Takings

Docurine,30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 137, 140 (2002).
375. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616-18, 631 (2001).
376. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321,.
323-24, 330 (2002).
377.
378.
fense
379.

Blumm, supra note 374, at 139.
See John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine As A Background PrinciplesDein Tkings Ligation,45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 931, 932 (2012).
See Sunmna Coip. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) (re-

jecting California's belated assertion of a public trust easement on certain private lands).
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power to redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property
[is] necessarily constrained by constitutional limits."'" An owner's property
right, for Fifth Amendment purposes, is defined by state law at the time ownership is acquired; "newly legislated or decreed" limitations which destroy the
economically beneficial use of a property right are compensable takings." This
is true whether the limitations are imposed by legislation, administrative action,
constitutional amendment, or judicial decision."
Colorado has rejected the public trust doctrine as inconsistent with rights
of appropriation under the state constitution. Unlike California law, which has
long recognized both riparian rights (as superior to appropriative rights) and
public trust constraints, past and present Colorado law provides no basis for
subjecting water rights to public trust purposes. Colorado water rights are vested property rights, fully protected by constitutional guarantees against takings
without compensation."' To impose a public trust on existing water rights at
this late date, even by constitutional amendment, would require compensation.
Thus, future proposals along the lines of Initiatives 3 and 45, to impose a public trust doctrine or "dominant water estate" on the state's waters, will likely
trigger the takings issue by redefining property rights clearly recognized under
Colorado law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Colorado's appropriation doctrine has met the state's water needs for well
over one hundred years. As new needs and values have arisen, including the
so-called "public trust values," they have been effectively addressed within that
system by a series of adaptations. As Justice Gregory Hobbs of the Colorado
Supreme Court has explained, "Colorado water law adapts and evolves to
meet society's changing values. Since the 1970s, there has been a persistent
effort to integrate environmental water values into the water rights legal framework."" There are "no aspects of the public interest that cannot be protected
within" Colorado's prior appropriation framework.' The CWCB's instream
flow program provides for stream flows and lake levels to preserve the natural
environment, including fisheries."' When new appropriations are insufficient
to protect such flows, the CWCB may acquire or lease more senior water
rights for this purpose." Federal agencies' water needs can be assigned priori380.
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ties for reserved or appropriated water rights, consistent with federal law, by
adjudication and administration in Colorado's priority system under the
McCarran Amendment." Local governments may protect reasonable flows for
recreational boating use through structures improving stream channels as "recreational in-channel diversions," consistent with other beneficial uses of water.'" Reservoir operations are often used to maintain flows for fisheries and
recreational boating." Such storage operations play a vital role in protecting
endangered fish species' habitat as part of the recovery program for the Upper
Colorado River." Moreover, Colorado has ample tools for protecting water
quality in concert with water rights administration under the prior appropriation doctrine." To avoid damage to the environment when water is transferred
from agricultural use, water courts now impose reasonable requirements for
revegetation and noxious weed management on historically irrigated land."
No one can say with certainty to what extent a "Colorado public trust doctrine" would transform Colorado water law. However, it would undoubtedly
require massive and endless litigation, both to determine the meaning of the
initiative, and to comply with its express requirements. The initiative's hostility
to private property is unwarranted, and would carry great costs. To the extent
reallocation of water to new uses is desired, Colorado's existing laws and market forces can achieve the goal while assuring no one's rights are taken or
damaged without compensation. Unlike property rights and market forces, the
public trust "trump card" takes away the incentive for private owners to conserve or wisely manage their property, putting the entire burden on the state
and the courts.
Colorado's water problems have typically been addressed through discussions among concerned parties. In many ways, those discussions are more
fruitful now than ever before, as negotiating parties find new and creative ways
to reach win-win-win solutions to old and new problems. The deadly weapon
programi/Pages/TeniporaryLoansWaterRightslnstreanFlows.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2012)
(such leases, in cooperation with the Colorado Water Trust, have protected stream flows under
drought conditions in 2012); see also Michael Schrantz, Colorado Water Twst release serves
purpose of protecting Yampa River; STEAMBOAT TODAY (Sept. 10, 2012),
http://www.steanboattoday.com/news/2012/sep/10/colorado-water-trust-release-serves-purposeprotec/.
388. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2012); see HOBBS, Piouity: The Most Misunderstood Stick n the
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CULTURE 303, 308-11 (2d ed. 2010).
389. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(5), 103(10.3) (2012); Colo. Water Conservation
Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2005) (en bauc).
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of a "strong public trust doctrine" would immediately shift these discussions
into the courtroom, replacing collaborative problem solving with destructive
legal warfare.

